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A limited nuclear war between India and Pakistan could ignite
fires large enough to emit more than 5 Tg of soot into the strato-
sphere. Climate model simulations have shown severe resulting
climate perturbations with declines in global mean temperature
by 1.8 ◦C and precipitation by 8%, for at least 5 y. Here we
evaluate impacts for the global food system. Six harmonized
state-of-the-art crop models show that global caloric produc-
tion from maize, wheat, rice, and soybean falls by 13 (±1)%,
11 (±8)%, 3 (±5)%, and 17 (±2)% over 5 y. Total single-year
losses of 12 (±4)% quadruple the largest observed historical
anomaly and exceed impacts caused by historic droughts and
volcanic eruptions. Colder temperatures drive losses more than
changes in precipitation and solar radiation, leading to strongest
impacts in temperate regions poleward of 30◦N, including the
United States, Europe, and China for 10 to 15 y. Integrated food
trade network analyses show that domestic reserves and global
trade can largely buffer the production anomaly in the first year.
Persistent multiyear losses, however, would constrain domestic
food availability and propagate to the Global South, especially
to food-insecure countries. By year 5, maize and wheat availabil-
ity would decrease by 13% globally and by more than 20% in
71 countries with a cumulative population of 1.3 billion people.
In view of increasing instability in South Asia, this study shows
that a regional conflict using<1% of the worldwide nuclear arse-
nal could have adverse consequences for global food security
unmatched in modern history.
food system shock | multiple breadbasket failure | cold temperature
yield response | India–Pakistan conflict | global gridded crop model
intercomparison (GGCMI)
The continued existence of nuclear weapons implies a riskto life on Earth not just from the immediate effects of the
war. Adverse indirect environmental and societal consequences
of sudden climate change due to a potential nuclear conflict—
especially for food production systems—were suggested during
the Cold War era (1–5). If targeted on urban areas, even small
air bursts by today’s standards, such as the 15-kt weapon used
on Hiroshima, could ignite fires releasing large amounts of black
carbon (soot). Once the smoke plume reaches the upper tro-
posphere, soot would absorb solar radiation and self-loft into
the stratosphere, where particles would spread globally within
months (6). The smoke from a single fire would not pro-
duce detectable climate impacts, but cumulative emissions from
many fires generating several teragrams of soot could substan-
tially absorb sunlight in the stratosphere, so that less energy
reaches the Earth’s surface, cooling it for about a decade (7, 8).
Soot injection and resulting reductions in surface tempera-
ture and precipitation could be larger and longer lasting than
after major volcanic eruptions such as Tambora (Indonesia)
in 1815, which caused widespread crop failures, famine, and
economic hardship (9).
Territorial disputes over the Kashmir region between India
and Pakistan provide an increasingly high level of instability (10,
11), and escalatory retaliation could result in the use of nuclear
weapons (12). This study highlights the indirect food system
consequences of a possible, limited nuclear war based on a pre-
viously published India–Pakistan scenario, assuming 5 Tg of soot
injection derived from a direct relationship between population
density and target-specific fuel load (7, 13).
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Climatic responses to large soot injections over South Asia
have been studied systematically (8, 13–17). The impacts of such
low-likelihood but severe events require careful investigation to
inform the public and policy makers in view of nuclear pro-
liferation and conflict. However, quantitative agricultural and
economic impact assessments are lacking (5, 18). Simplified stud-
ies for single crops (5, 19) or individual locations in the United
States or China (20–22) point to potentially large crop failures.
But a critical knowledge gap exists regarding how such produc-
tion disturbances unfold globally and potentially cause reper-
cussions for the food trade system (23, 24). Here we present a
comprehensive and internally consistent global-scale assessment
framework, including state-of-the-art ensemble climate and crop
model simulations of the production and trade responses of the
major staple crops (maize, wheat, rice, and soybean) to a regional
nuclear conflict, while explicitly quantifying the main sources of
uncertainty.
We employ published climate simulations based on two ver-
sions of the Community Earth System Model (CESM) (25). To
address uncertainties associated with smoke aerosols in the cli-
mate model, we complement simulations from 2014 (15) (climate
forcing 1 [CF1]) with additional realizations based on the same
5-Tg scenario, but with an updated CESM and revised aerosol
representation (13) (CF2). Both simulation sets provide three
ensemble members starting from different initial conditions.
To convert the climate model forcing into bias-corrected
inputs for high-resolution crop models, we use anomalies from
climate model outputs to perturb an observational daily weather
dataset (1981 to 2009) (26). This reduces climate model bias,
preserves natural variability, and thus improves reliability of the
crop modeling (27). Each postconflict year is simulated for 29 y
of historical observations to identify interannual differences
across years perturbed with identical forcing (SI Appendix, Fig.
S1). Six well-established global mechanistic crop models (EPIC-
BOKU, GEPIC, LPJmL, pDSSAT, PEPIC, and PROMET; see
SI Appendix, Table S1 for details and full model names), as part
of the global gridded crop model intercomparison (GGCMI)
(28, 29), simulate impacts on crop production following a har-
monized protocol; that is, harvested areas, growing periods, and
fertilizer applications are externally prescribed through observa-
tional data. To avoid confounding effects from temporal trends,
all inputs except weather are held constant in time (Materials and
Methods).
Beyond direct domestic implications, large production anoma-
lies can have cascading effects through the food trade system
(23). To track the dynamics of multiyear production anoma-
lies, we use a trade mass-balance network to evaluate changes
in country-level food reserves and use (30). Observed data of
maize and wheat production, reserves, and trade create network
dependencies into which we introduce simulated annual produc-
tion anomalies of both crops for 5 y after the conflict (we focus
on maize and wheat to improve robustness; see Materials and
Methods). Production shortfalls are compensated first by access-
ing reserves and drawing on food imports and then by reducing
both domestic use and food exports, which propagate supply
shocks to trade partners. India and Pakistan are excluded from
the analysis by removing them from the trade network (to avoid
arbitrary assumptions regarding the direct effects of the war; see
below). Together, the simulated crop production anomalies and
changes in trade-mediated food supply project overall impacts
of a potential production shock on national food availability
(SI Appendix, Fig. S1).
We address research questions that remain unresolved since
the original studies of agricultural consequences of nuclear war
(5): 1) Where, and to what degree, would global staple crop
production be affected by a limited nuclear war? 2) How large
are the main sources of uncertainty associated with the crop
response? And 3) to what extent would trade dependencies
buffer and propagate production anomalies and impair food
supply globally?
Climate Perturbations and Implications for Crop Production
Simulations of the 5-Tg soot case show attenuation of the incom-
ing solar radiation, cooling of the surface, and weakening of the
global hydrological cycle for at least a decade. An average of the
first 5 y of the CF1 and CF2 climate anomalies shows declines
in global mean surface air temperature by 1.8 ◦C, precipitation
by 7.9%, and incoming shortwave and longwave solar radiation
by 4.9% and 1.9%, respectively (Fig. 1; see SI Appendix, Fig.
S2 for spatial pattern), producing the coldest average surface
temperature in the last 1,000 y (9, 18, 31).
These climate perturbations reduce total global caloric pro-
duction from maize, wheat, rice, and soybean by 10.8% (SD
of crop models ±3.1%, other uncertainties addressed below)
annually, averaged over the first 5 postconflict years (Fig. 2).
Largest single-year losses are 12.4% (±4.0%) in year 4 after
the conflict, which equals 4.8 times the historical SD (1981 to
2009) and exceeds by 2.7 times the largest observed anomaly
in the record of the UN Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAOSTAT) since 1961 (−4.6% in 2012, against the 1961 to 2017
average).
The crop impacts follow the characteristic timeline of the cli-
mate anomalies with a sharp decline and gradual recovery after
10 to 15 y (Fig. 3 and SI Appendix, Figs. S3–S6). While short-
wave radiation anomalies peak within the first or second year,
the temperature response is lagged by 3 to 4 y (Fig. 1) due to
ocean thermal inertia and sea ice expansion (15). The CF2 sim-
ulations treat smoke as fractal particles and allow coagulation,
which results in larger particles with a shorter lifetime and thus
faster recovery compared to CF1 (13).
Maize—the linchpin in the global food system, accounting
for about 35% of total global cereal production and trade
(32) (“cereals” herein refer to all FAOSTAT cereal crops, plus
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Fig. 1. Nuclear conflict-induced global climate perturbations. Changes in
(A) 2-m air temperature (◦C), (B) precipitation (%), and (C) surface incoming
shortwave and (D) longwave solar radiation (%) are shown across 15 post-
conflict years for two climate simulation sets (climate forcing 1 and 2), with
three ensemble members each (runs a–c). Changes are shown as absolute
(temperature) and relative (all other variables) differences between control
and perturbed global mean values, calculated over the global land area. The
average year 1 to 5 change is highlighted on top of the shaded boxes.
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Fig. 2. Postconflict change of global staple crop production. Conflict-
related impacts on global caloric production of maize, wheat, rice, soybean,
and their total are shown for combined (red), rainfed (gray), and irrigated
(blue) production. Changes are shown for the crop model ensemble mean
(colored bars; the SD is indicated by horizontal lines) for the postconflict
year with largest “combined” declines per crop (respective year is shown on
top of the bar). All data are averaged across climate simulation sets. Black
bars centered on the zero line illustrate the SD of unperturbed historical
variability (1981 to 2009). Circled percentages highlight the 5-y postcon-
flict average change. “Total” refers to the cumulated caloric production
of the four crops, and percentage numbers in parentheses and the circle
sizes indicate the respective fraction of current total global cereal produc-
tion (including soybean). The bar width for total is increased to emphasize
main results.
soybean)—shows production losses of 12.6% (±1.2%) globally,
on average for 5 y after the conflict (Fig. 3). For the same
time period, the United States and Canada (currently providing
>40% of global maize production) would face 17.5% (±2.4%)
production losses, China and East Asia (18% of global pro-
duction) 6.3% (±1.2%), Europe (15% of global production)
16.7% (±5.5%), and Russia (1.8% of global production) 48.2%
(±4.5%). The largest global single-year loss for maize is 14.1%
(±2.6%) in postconflict year 4 (Fig. 2), which would be 60%
more severe than in the historic 1988 drought year (−9% glob-
ally), the largest maize anomaly in the FAOSTAT record (SI
Appendix, Fig. S7).
Production losses for wheat, the second most important global
grain (24% of current cereal production), are 10.9% (±8.1%)
globally for the 5-y average. While the peak impact (−14% ±
9.1% in year 4) is similar to that for maize, the crop model dis-
agreement is substantially larger for wheat (ranging from −3 to
−30%; Fig. 2). This is in part because wheat simulation responses
differ for winter and spring varieties and in part because different
vernalization requirements for winter wheat introduce spread in
crop model results (33). Winter wheat shows larger 5-y aver-
age impacts (−13.3%; SI Appendix, Fig. S3) than spring wheat
(−6.9%; SI Appendix, Fig. S4), because winter wheat experiences
colder temperatures during its growing period that are more
likely to cross critical thresholds.
Among all crops studied, rice (21% of cereal production)
shows lowest overall losses; the 3.4% (±4.6%) loss in year 5
barely exceeds the historical SD (Fig. 2 and SI Appendix, Fig. S5).
The crop model spread, however, is high (−9 to +4%). Soybean
exhibits the largest global-scale impacts with 16.8% (±2.2%)
production decline on average for 5 y, supported by robust model
agreement (Fig. 2 and SI Appendix, Fig. S6). Yet, its contribu-
tion to total cereal production is only 10%. Together, the four
crops account for 90% of current total global cereal production
in caloric equivalents (32).
India and Pakistan are excluded from the analyses, not only
to focus on climatic effects on agriculture in the rest of the
world, but also because our analysis framework cannot account
adequately for other direct effects of a war (radioactive fallout
and negative effects on health, labor, and infrastructure). How-
ever, if both countries are included under the assumption that
domestic staple crop production fails completely after the war,
global caloric losses would increase from−11 to−19% (5-y aver-
age), mainly driven by production losses for wheat and rice (SI
Appendix, Table S2).
Geographic Pattern, Uncertainty, and Attribution
Yield impacts follow a distinct geographic pattern, with declines
>30% at latitudes beyond 30◦N (Fig. 3), where surface tem-
perature and shortwave radiation fall by >3 ◦C and >10%,
respectively. Precipitation changes are spatially heterogeneous,
with potential gains in Central America and the Mediterranean
despite large reductions at higher latitudes (SI Appendix, Fig.
S2). A latitudinal profile of crop yield losses suggests that all four
crops follow largely similar response patterns, with main impacts
poleward of 30◦N and S, where climate impacts are greatest and
where crop growth is increasingly temperature limited. However,
the geographic distribution of current cropland extent differs
substantially among crops (Fig. 4) and therefore leads to the
differentiated overall production response. Rice, for instance,
is predominantly grown between 30◦N and S, which explains
smaller overall impacts. The latitudinal profile of wheat yield
declines, on the other hand, mainly coincides with the actual
cropland extent. Moreover, rainfed systems generally experience
more severe negative impacts (−14% global 5-y average) than
irrigated systems (−6%) globally across all crops except rice
(Fig. 2), in large part because irrigated systems are generally
located at lower latitudes where temperature reductions are both
smaller and less harmful to crops.
Overall, the developed world is shown to face the largest total
crop losses, while lower-latitude tropical regions have less severe
implications and even potential gains, although the latter is not
supported by all crop models. Model agreement is greatest at
higher latitudes, where differences between climate model real-
izations become more important than between crop models,
while climate model disagreement remains small compared to
the perturbation signal (Fig. 3).
Maize yield responses to single climate drivers individually
perturbed one at a time reveal that temperature is the largest
factor globally (−5.0%, 5-y average; Fig. 5 and SI Appendix,
Fig. S8). Cooler temperatures affect high-latitude temperature-
limited agriculture, primarily through failure to reach physio-
logical maturity within a growing season and cold damage (SI
Appendix, Fig. S9). The temperature response function of simu-
lated maize yields appears to be linear between −1.5 and −4 ◦C
local annual mean change (SI Appendix, Fig. S10). While pre-
cipitation (−2.5%), shortwave radiation (−3.7%), and longwave
radiation (−0.9%) have smaller weights, this attribution shows
that all factors are largely additive under this climate perturba-
tion (−12.1% combined perturbation, 5-y average; Fig. 5). The
crop models exhibit different response mechanisms to individ-
ual drivers, but they arrive at remarkably similar outcomes when
collectively perturbed (SI Appendix, Fig. S8; more details in SI
Appendix, Decomposition of Crop Model Responses).
We address three main sources of uncertainty in the integrated
analysis: the climate model forcing from 5 Tg soot injection,
the relative importance of the climate in the year in which the
conflict occurs, and the crop model response itself. Decompo-
sition of these uncertainty components reveals that they are
roughly similar in overall contribution to simulated staple crop
production under the nuclear conflict scenario (SI Appendix,
Fig. S11). However, while the crop model response is the small-
est source of uncertainty for maize and soy, it is the largest
Ja¨germeyr et al. PNAS Latest Articles | 3 of 11
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Fig. 3. Spatial and temporal patterns of maize impacts. (A) Relative maize yield changes (%) are shown as 5-y postconflict averages across the crop and
climate model ensemble. (B–K) Time-series Insets illustrate aggregated changes in maize production (%) at (B) the global level and (C–K) nine world regions,
for the participating crop models (line type), and two climate simulation sets (line color; climate forcing 1 [gray] and climate forcing 2 [yellow]), respectively.
Mean years 1 to 5 production changes are highlighted on top of the shaded boxes. The contribution of each world region to global maize production
is indicated in the bottom-right corner of the regional Insets. Grid cells (0.5◦) with <10 ha maize harvested area are masked from the map (white) and
hatching indicates cells in which not all crop models agree on the sign of simulated yield change. India and Pakistan are excluded.
source for wheat and rice. We find substantial differences in
crop production impacts across uniformly perturbed historical
years (i.e., each postconflict year of climate model anoma-
lies is evaluated by the crop models across historical weather
observations, from 1981 to 2009; SI Appendix, Fig. S1), with
smallest relative impacts in below-average years (e.g., historic
drought in 1988, an El Nin˜o year) and largest relative and
absolute impacts in favorable years (e.g., 1992) (SI Appendix,
Fig. S7). For maize, the largest global loss across historical
and postconflict years is 25% in 1992 and postconflict year 4
(SI Appendix, Table S4). The relative nature of the historical
year has a larger influence on the response of global crop pro-
duction than differences between the climate model ensemble
simulations (CF1 and CF2, with three ensemble members each)
for all crops but wheat, where both sources are comparatively
small (SI Appendix, Fig. S11). There is no statistically signifi-
cant trend in yield impacts over uniformly perturbed historical
yields (SI Appendix, Fig. S7).
Global Trade Repercussions
Direct crop production losses after the nuclear conflict are con-
centrated primarily in the Northern Hemisphere, yet the shock
is transmitted globally through international food trade. Indeed,
the trade effects are especially severe as many of the most impor-
tant cereal grain exporters are disproportionately impacted,
including the United States, Canada, Europe, Russia, China, and
Australia (23).
In the trade network analysis, countries respond to produc-
tion losses by drawing on domestic food reserves, adjusting
trade flows, and reducing domestic use, in that order. Reserves
therefore serve to buffer the effect of production declines on a
country’s trade partners and domestic use. To better understand
the impacts of the production declines, we combine the main
simulation outputs—reserves and domestic use—into a key food
security indicator known as the stocks-to-use ratio (STU), which
is the country’s food reserves relative to its domestic use.
The initial state of the food trade network is based on observed
data of food production, trade, and reserves averaged from 2006
to 2008. Globally, the initial STU for maize and wheat is 0.20
(Fig. 6), meaning that reserves hold 20% of the world’s annual
demand (i.e., reserves could satisfy demand for 2.4 mo). Global
initial reserves are higher for wheat (STU of 0.25) than for maize
(STU of 0.16; SI Appendix, Figs. S12 and S13).
From this initial state, we track the repercussions of the pro-
duction anomalies in the first 5 postconflict years using two
networks, based on maize and wheat commodities separately
(SI Appendix, Figs. S12 and S13; we focus on maize and wheat
as their trade network results are more reliable; they con-
tribute 69% of the export volume of the four crops studied; see
Materials and Methods). In the first postconflict year, global
reserves largely succeed in buffering the loss in production (both
crops combined, Fig. 6). Food supply and trade demands stay
near preconflict levels while global average STU for maize and
wheat declines from 20 to 11%.
Maize reserves are largely depleted after year 1 in the
majority of key exporting countries. Wheat reserves are largely
depleted after year 2, further accelerating the propagation of the
shock to the Global South. Continued production losses, mainly
unbuffered after year 2, translate into reductions in domestic
use of both crops (Fig. 6). By year 4, most major maize- and
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Fig. 4. Latitudinal profile of crop yield changes and cropland extent. Current cropland extent of the staple crops (A) maize, (B) wheat, (C) rice, and (D)
soybean is shown across latitude bands as fractions of the crop-specific global extent (top x axis). Relative changes (5-y postconflict average) in crop yields
are shown as latitude averages, based on rainfed crop simulations in all grid cells, unconstrained by current cropland areas (bottom x axis). The overlaps of
gray and tan indicate areas with potentially adverse effects on current crop production. Yield data are presented as climate and crop model averages.
wheat-producing and trading countries—132 of 153 (combined
population 5 billion people; SI Appendix, Table S3)—exhaust
their reserves, and the global STU falls to 0.4%.
Even with reserve capacities and reduced exports, major
exporting countries still experience substantial reductions in
maize and wheat availability by the end of year 4, includ-
ing Canada (−48% maize domestic use), Mexico (−26%
maize), and Poland (−33% wheat). However, countries that rely
heavily on imports to meet demand, many of which already face
severe food insecurity, experience the largest constraints, includ-
ing Libya (−69% wheat), Niger (−63% wheat), Somalia (−92%
wheat), Rwanda (−75% wheat), Syria (−70% maize), Yemen
(−37% wheat), Honduras (−39% maize), El Salvador (−38%
maize), Haiti (−40% wheat), and Bangladesh (−41% wheat;
SI Appendix, Tables S4 and S5). The United States, Brazil, and
Argentina are among the few major countries that face losses in
domestic maize and wheat use <3%, because high initial export
shares are assumed to be reallocated to domestic use.
Globally, the reduction in domestic maize and wheat use
increases from 1.2 to 13.0% between postconflict years 1 and 4,
and the average reduction over the 5-y simulation period is 7.5%.
The population in countries that face constraints to domestic use
of >10% increases from 200 million in year 1 to 3.9 billion by
year 4 (9 countries in year 1, 101 countries in year 4; SI Appendix,
Table S3). A total of 1.3 billion (71 countries) and 600 million
(45 countries) people live in countries that would face domestic
use constraints of >20% and >30%, respectively, after year 4.
Finally, crop production and food availability begin to recover in
year 5 (SI Appendix, Figs. S12 and S13).
These results indicate the potential for a complete collapse
in trade volumes, with all major exporters imposing bans on
food exports. In the model, exports are banned when reserves
are fully depleted, which is a conservative estimate as regulatory
measures might be imposed earlier. Overall, the trade simula-
tions suggest that current food stocks and international trade
can largely buffer a sizable single-year anomaly, but persistent
multiyear production losses would have severe implications for
national food availability and thus food security.
Discussion
This study shows that a soot-induced sudden global cooling of
about 1.8 ◦C would—for 5 to 10 y—be more harmful to global
agriculture than the same amount of warming associated with
anthropogenic climate change (34, 35), as growth-enhancing
effects of higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations are lacking.
Large volcanic eruptions have led to historic famines—e.g.,
after Laki in 1783 to 1784 and the 1816 “year without a sum-
mer” after the Tambora eruption (9, 31)—but the cooling in
each of the cases was < 1 ◦C and lasted only about 1 y (36). Sud-
den cooling by 1.8 ◦C from a limited nuclear war could cause 5-y
average losses of >11% globally and >18% in the United States
(up to 41% depending on the individual year in which the con-
flict occurs), which would exceed impacts during the Dust Bowl
of the 1930s, the most severe period of droughts in recent US
history (37). This study shows that 5-Tg soot emissions could trig-
ger a severe food production shock, four times larger and more
persistent than any recent extreme event since the beginning
of the FAOSTAT record in 1961 (32). Depleting food reserves
and trade dependencies would propagate the disruption to the
Global South and reduce food availability in 71 countries by
>20% and globally by 13%—suggesting that such food supply
shock would have more severe societal implications than any
other event documented in recent history.
The integrated simulation results indicate that this type of pro-
duction shock would be experienced as a multiple-breadbasket
failure. In contrast to local food system disruptions, such syn-
chronized shocks potentially could not be alleviated by global
trade or food aid as major export countries are hit hard-
est (24). Considering that smaller production shocks—as for
instance in 2010, where wheat production fell by 33, 19, and
14% in Russia, Ukraine, and Canada, respectively (32)—are
often associated with commodity price surges, critical spikes
in global food prices could ensue, particularly in view of the
multiyear nature of this anomaly. Inflated food prices can exac-
erbate inequalities and social unrest, especially in developing
countries (38).
Current grain reserves are shown to largely be depleted within
1 y after the conflict, which results in vulnerabilities of national
food supplies in subsequent years. The trade network analy-
sis is based on the average crop production response across
29 historical years, meaning that individual years can cause
larger losses (SI Appendix, Fig. S7) and potentially put addi-
tional stress on the global food system. More generally, the
model captures critical cascading effects of a food produc-
tion shock with a short-term, nonlinear, and out-of-equilibrium
response often not addressed in equilibrium-based integrated
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Fig. 5. Maize yield and production sensitivity to individually perturbed climate drivers. Changes in simulated maize yield (%) for climate input variables
perturbed one at a time: (A) air temperature, (B) precipitation, and (C) surface incoming shortwave solar radiation, filled in with control AgMERRA climate.
(D) The combined perturbation has all four drivers perturbed collectively. Percentage numbers at the top of each plot indicate the respective global caloric
production change. This sensitivity study is performed for climate model simulation CF1a and by the crop models EPIC-BOKU, GEPIC, LPJmL, pDSSAT, and
PEPIC. Data are shown as the mean across crop models, post conflict years 1 to 5, 29 y of historical climatology, and rainfed and irrigated systems. India and
Pakistan are excluded.
assessment model approaches. While our results provide evi-
dence for substantial reductions in national food availability
after a persistent multiyear anomaly, characterizations of reduc-
tions in specific per capita food consumption or human health
impacts require more detailed considerations of local economic
conditions, food access, and nutrition. Nevertheless, it is likely
that national trade restrictions to stabilize domestic markets
and price spikes would spread and compound international
market instability (39), thereby aggravating food shortages in
resource-poor communities and potentially triggering additional
hunger and other adverse human health implications around
the world.
Crop model results are in line with previous provisional esti-
mates under a similar 5 Tg soot scenario (20, 22), also confirming
that irrigated systems are more resilient—this study provides a
comprehensive global multimodel assessment across major crops
(six different crop models and two different climate model con-
figurations), critical for evaluating economic ramifications. Yield
losses are attributed to anomalies in temperature, precipitation,
and radiation. Lower temperatures affect crop growth directly
by slowing phenological development, reducing photosynthetic
activity, damaging tissue, and reducing root growth; indirect
effects can occur via for instance water stress, nitrogen cycling,
and snow cover. Crop development is slower in cooler weather,
and crop models demonstrate that the temperature anomaly
extends current growing periods to the point that higher-latitude
crops fail to reach physiological maturity (SI Appendix, Fig. S9).
Longer growing periods also increase the risk of frost expo-
sure. Direct frost damage, however, is currently not considered
in all global crop models, which contributes to uncertainties (SI
Appendix, Table S1). Overall, despite differences in responses to
individual climate drivers, the ensemble of crop models agrees
on an estimate of crop responses at a global level (SI Appendix,
Fig. S8).
Soot injections lead to higher stratospheric temperatures,
which in turn would cause stratospheric ozone depletion (8,
16). Since ozone strongly absorbs UV radiation, soot injection
leads to enhancement of UV levels at the land surface, espe-
cially poleward of 20◦N and S (15, 16), with additional hazards
to agriculture and human health (4, 5). Increased UV is shown to
reduce plant growth rates, but also to improve crop quality and
pest resistance (40). The large-scale net effect remains unclear
and as of yet no models have been developed to simulate mecha-
nistic UV effects on cereal yield and quality (41). Surface ozone
is likely to deplete as well, which can reduce surface ozone dam-
age to crops (42), an effect not considered here. On the other
hand, observations show that plant canopies use diffuse radiation
more efficiently than direct sunlight (43). Increased diffuse light
due to sooty aerosols may therefore partially offset reductions
in insolation, but the global gross significance of this complex
relationship remains unresolved (44, 45). CO2 emissions from
the ensuing fires are considered marginal at the global level (1)
and its atmospheric concentration in the crop models is thus held
constant over the simulation period. Other yield-limiting factors
due to social disruptions—including shortages of labor, fuel, fer-
tilizer, and seeds, but also the nutritional value of crops—are not
considered here, and have the potential to further reduce crop
production and quality.
Adaptation potentials to the climate anomalies studied here
include switching to faster-maturing crop varieties or other crops
that tolerate lower temperatures and radiation levels [e.g., pota-
toes or beets instead of cereal grain (46)]. These could help
alleviate production shocks in subsequent growing seasons, but
seed and infrastructure availability and farming system knowl-
edge might be limiting factors for ad hoc implementation at a
large scale (18). If water availability allows, supplemental irriga-
tion could stabilize yields in regions with precipitation declines
such as in parts of the United States and the North China
Plains, and cutting allocations for biofuel and feed crops could
provide additional opportunities especially at lower latitudes. A
precautionary building of larger food stockpiles is controversial
but might increase the buffer in the first year after the produc-
tion disruption. While a coordinated effort by countries with
large reserves (e.g., >3 mo worth of their own domestic use)
for strategic releases could play a stabilizing role in the global
food system, there is no plan for major food-producing countries
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Fig. 6. Initial and postconflict food reserves and domestic use. For maize and wheat combined, stocks-to-use ratios (%)—food reserves relative to domestic
use—are shown at the country level for (A) current conditions (2006 to 2008 average), (C) the postconflict year 1, and (E) postconflict year 4. B, D, and
F show maize and wheat domestic use, as (B) absolute preconflict kilocalories per capita and (D and F) relative postconflict changes (%) for (D) year 1
and (F) year 4, which is the year with largest declines (SI Appendix, Figs. S12 and S13). The trade network analysis evaluates national caloric crop pro-
duction changes averaged across crop and climate models, but individually for each crop (without substitution between crops). India and Pakistan are
excluded.
to proactively intervene in response to a multiple-breadbasket
failure (23).
We employed a case with 5 Tg of soot that has been evalu-
ated in several climate models producing similar results (16, 31).
Besides the South Asia case evaluated here, other nuclear con-
flicts are possible (13). Recent CESM simulations successfully
reproduced observed soot lofting and transport in the strato-
sphere after the 2017 forest fires in Canada, providing observa-
tional evidence and validation for some of the assumptions in the
climate simulations used herein (6). The season and geographic
location of soot emissions could influence soot production, rain-
out, and lofting, yet a systematic evaluation is lacking (6, 15).
The size of the conflict, fuel load, smoke composition, and plume
rise introduce additional uncertainties (6, 8, 15, 17, 31, 47, 48).
Recently revised estimates of combustible material with today’s
larger nuclear arsenals render previous assumptions of 5 Tg soot
conservative and suggest that soot production may range from
5 to 36 Tg for the India–Pakistan case (13). Climatic responses
are shown to proportionally increase with higher soot emissions
and our findings suggest a linear crop yield decline across local
temperature reductions between −1.5 and −4 ◦C (SI Appendix,
Fig. S10).
Yield impacts across uniformly perturbed historical years do
not reveal a statistically significant trend (SI Appendix, Fig. S7)
despite the underlying increase in global mean temperature,
suggesting that a conflict shifted into the near future would
likely result in similar crop responses. The relative temperature
anomaly would be similar even under additional global warming
and crop cultivars are expected to be adapted to warmer growing
periods in the future (49), likely leading to somewhat comparable
crop responses. However, our results would not necessarily apply
several decades into the future, where regional impacts might
be different due to local rainfall and temperature changes with
unabated climate change. Recently, systematic warming experi-
ments with the same GGCMI models used here show that crop
yields—at global average level and without cultivar adaptation—
also decline under positive local temperature change exceeding
0.5 to 1 ◦C (50, 51). This global signal entails high-latitude gains
under moderate warming and substantial losses in the tropics,
complementing the picture we find here under colder temper-
atures. Using artificial stratospheric aerosols to reduce global
warming has been suggested as a climate intervention (geoengi-
neering) strategy (52). While such solar radiation management
is associated with many other risks still poorly understood (45,
53), potentially viable options for deployment would use sulfate
aerosols, not soot. Soot would, besides other risks, cause ozone
destruction (54).
In conclusion, a robust signal across climate and crop mod-
els suggests that even a limited nuclear war could substantially
impair staple crop production with 20 to 50% losses above
30◦N, or 11% globally, on average for 5 y after the conflict.
Such persistent production anomalies are shown to exceed those
caused by historic droughts and volcano eruptions. This study
provides evidence that current global food reserves and trade
cannot avert ensuing constraints to domestic food availabil-
ity; domestic use of maize and wheat is shown to decline by
>10% in countries with a total population of 3.7 billion inhab-
itants. Food system implications of a regional nuclear war unfold
globally, with the largest impacts on countries that are main
food producers.
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Materials and Methods
Experimental Design. To investigate indirect implications of a nuclear con-
flict on global food supply, we use two previously published climate model
simulation sets that evaluate both fire-related soot emissions of 5 Tg and
resulting climate perturbations using well-established Earth system mod-
els with interactive coupling of the atmosphere, land, ocean, and sea ice
(13, 15). We calculate climate simulation anomalies to perturb an observa-
tional historical weather dataset to generate a bias-free and high-resolution
weather dataset for global crop modeling. Each postconflict year of cli-
mate forcing is used to perturb 31 y of historical weather data, respectively,
to sample interannual differences (only 29 y are analyzed; see below). Six
leading global process-based crop models use this set of the weather per-
turbations to run simulations for the four major staple crops: maize, wheat,
rice, and soybean. In addition, climate sensitivity runs in which climate
drivers are perturbed one at a time are performed to identify the crop
response to each driver individually (temperature, precipitation, and short-
and longwave radiation). To represent realistic geographic crop production
patterns, we combine simulated fractional crop yield changes with spatially
explicit yield observations. Aggregated country-level production anomalies
simulated by the crop models are then introduced into a food trade network
to assess global effects on food reserves and domestic use (see SI Appendix,
Fig. S1 for an overview of the simulation protocol).
Nuclear Conflict Scenario. The first climate model simulation set (hence-
forth CF1) uses a simple set of assumptions involving 100 Hiroshima-sized
detonations of 15 kt yield on the most populated urban areas in India
and Pakistan (31, 47). Each detonation is assumed to burn an area of
13 km2, and based on detailed quantification of combustible material
in the target regions, this scenario injects ∼5 Tg of soot aerosol parti-
cles into the upper troposphere at 150 to 300 hPa. After assuming that
20% of the soot rained out below 300 hPa, it is injected uniformly over
a broad area over Pakistan and northern portions of India (15, 47). The
soot particles are assumed to be monodisperse and are not allowed to
coagulate. After emission, an additional 10 to 15% of the soot rains
out from the upper troposphere as the remainder is lofted into the
stratosphere (15, 47). This low rainout efficiency based on inefficient
removal of small, fresh smoke particles is supported by observations of
convection associated with forest fires (55).
To explore the sensitivity of the climate model simulations to assump-
tions about aerosols and soot emissions, we consider a second climate model
simulation set (CF2) using the same total amount of tropospheric soot emis-
sion, but based on targets using updated fuel loads and an updated climate
model version (13). Here only forty-four 15-kt weapons result in 5 Tg of
soot, again assuming 20% initial removal in the troposphere. In contrast to
CF1, the smoke injections are spatially explicit at the target location and
spread over a period of 4 d (6 at day 0, 16 at day 1, 16 at day 2, 6 at day 3)
(13). Soot is represented as fractal particles that are allowed to coagulate,
forming larger particle sizes, which can fall out faster than the smaller par-
ticles in CF1. As they are fractals, they have smaller fall velocities and more
absorption than spherical particles with a comparable mass. Similar to CF1,
a significant fraction of the soot is rained out in the upper troposphere as
the remainder is lofted into the stratosphere.
The assumptions herein have been investigated by multiple studies (8,
13, 15, 31) and systematically evaluated by Stenke et al. (16), who simu-
lated 1- to 12-Tg soot emissions. Recently refined calculations of combustible
material with today’s larger arsenals and higher population densities ren-
der previous assumptions of 5 Tg soot as the lower end of estimates. Toon
et al. (13) suggest emission of 5 to 36 Tg soot for the India–Pakistan case,
depending on assumptions of weapon yield. To be consistent with CF1 and
to evaluate effects of different aerosol treatment, we here focus on the
5 Tg case.
Climate Model Simulations with 5 Tg Soot Emission. Both CF1 and CF2 sim-
ulation sets are previously published (13, 15), but for clarity we provide
a brief methods description here. Soot is injected into the upper tropo-
sphere over the Indian subcontinent on 15 May 2013 (CF1) and 15 May
2000 (CF2). Simulations run 26 (CF1) and 15 (CF2) transient years post-
conflict, using carbon dioxide concentrations according to RCP 4.5 (CF1)
and fixed values at year 2000 levels (CF2) (13, 15). Both CF1 and CF2
performed three model realizations based on different initial conditions
(Fig. 1, runs a–c).
Climate simulations for CF1 and CF2 were performed with NCAR’s CESM,
a state-of-the-art, fully coupled, global climate model, configured with
fully interactive ocean, land, sea ice, and atmospheric components (25).
The atmospheric component is represented by the Whole Atmosphere
Community Climate Model, version 4 (WACCM). WACCM is a high-top
chemistry–climate model that extends from the surface to 5.1 × 106 hPa
(∼140 km). It has 66 vertical levels and spatial resolution of 1.9◦ latitude ×
2.5◦ longitude.
WACCM includes interactive chemistry that is fully integrated into its
dynamics and physics (15). To represent the evolution of smoke injection
more accurately, the CF2 simulations are based on a WACCM version with
advanced stratospheric aerosol microphysics by being coupled with the
Community Aerosol and Radiation Model for Atmospheres (CARMA) (56).
CARMA is a sectional aerosol parameterization that resolves the aerosol size
distribution and allows it to evolve freely [more details in Toon et al. (13)].
Smoke emission, rainout, injection height, and self-lofting into the strato-
sphere can vary by season and geographic location. Previous studies that
inject smoke only into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere
indicate that the seasonality of soot injection might not fundamentally
affect the global multiyear climate response (6), but there is no systematic
assessment yet.
Overall, the WACCM model framework is well established and evalu-
ated and has been used for instance to successfully simulate the climate
and atmospheric chemistry after the asteroid impact that caused the extinc-
tion of the dinosaurs 66 million y ago (57), and it successfully reproduced
the observations from soot lofting of smoke injected by pyrocumulonimbus
clouds after the 2017 Canadian wildfires (6).
Climate Perturbation Protocol for Crop Model Simulations. We use the daily
bias-adjusted climate forcing dataset AgMERRA (Agricultural applications
version of the Modern-Era Retrospective Analysis for Research and Applica-
tions, 1980 to 2010) (26) both for control simulations and for constructing
the perturbation climatology (see below). AgMERRA is designed for ana-
lyzing agricultural impacts related to climate variability and climate change
with global coverage. It is derived from the NASA Modern-Era Retrospective
analysis for Research and Applications (MERRA). We use the following daily
climate variables at 0.5◦ spatial resolution: mean, minimum, and maximum
2-m air temperature (T , Tmin, and Tmax, respectively [◦C]), precipitation
(P [mm/d]), and shortwave and longwave radiation (SR and LR [W/m2]). LR
is not provided by AgMERRA and substituted with an alternative from the
WFDEI product (WATCH forcing data [WFD] methodology applied to the
ERA-Interim [EI] reanalysis) (58).
For each postconflict year of the six climate model simulations (CF1a-c,
CF2a-c) we extract monthly anomalies for the four climate variables to
perturb the 31-y historical AgMERRA dataset (SI Appendix, Fig. S1). This
“delta shifting” is done for three reasons: 1) Higher spatial resolution
improves crop model simulations; 2) each year of the nuclear conflict per-
turbation (26 and 15 y for CF1 and CF2, respectively) is simulated for
31 historical years individually, which allows addressing interannual dif-
ferences across historical years perturbed with identical climate forcing;
and 3) no bias adjustment is required and we maintain the observed
weather variability of AgMERRA. Representing natural variability in the
weather input is critical for reliable crop yield estimates (27). The monthly
delta-shifting approach neglects potential changes in daily climate variabil-
ity. However, the SD of daily temperature and precipitation in perturbed
postconflict climate model simulations is virtually unchanged compared
to that in the control climate simulations, which supports the delta-
shifting approach and suggests that we are not missing potentially adverse
additional effects due to increased daily variability in the climate model
simulations.
This setup creates 3 × 26 (CF1a-c) and 3 × 15 (CF2a-c) individual simula-
tions, each with 31 transient years of perturbed AgMERRA data. In favor
of simulating multiple historical years for the same climate anomaly, the
simulation protocol entails transient historical simulations separately for
each postconflict year (SI Appendix, Fig. S1), which neglects carryover effects
between postconflict years. Those are, however, expected to be less impor-
tant than the carryover effects between historical transient simulations. The
first and last years of the transient runs are removed from crop model
simulations due to partially incomplete growing seasons.
The anomaly forcing term for temperature (∆T , calculated individually
for T , Tmin, and Tmax) is the absolute difference between climate model
control (Tcon) and perturbation (Tper) in each grid cell c, postconflict year
y, and month m:
∆Ty,m,c = Tpery,m,c − Tcony,m,c. [1]
∆T is then added to the daily control AgMERRA time series to create
the delta-corrected product (TAG) with constant perturbation across all 31
AgMERRA years (a):
TAGy,a,m,c = TAGa,m,c + ∆Ty,m,c. [2]
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Forcing terms for P, SR, and LR are calculated as relative changes, such as
∆SRy,m,c =
SRpery,m,c
SRcony,m,c
. [3]
For precipitation, PRcon is the multiyear average control climatology to
reduce interannual variability. The P, SR, and LR ∆ term is then multiplied
with the daily control AgMERRA time series:
SRAGy,a,m,c = SRAGa,m,c × ∆SRy,m,c. [4]
Net longwave radiation for use in the LPJmL model is calculated from T [K]
and LR, using the Stefan–Boltzmann equation, assuming emissivity is 1:
LRnet = (5.670373 ∗ 10−8 × T4)− LR. [5]
The PROMET model requires subdaily weather data and therefore uses
ERA-Interim instead of AgMERRA data. Since we use crop yield anomalies
from each model separately (see below), the differences between AgMERRA
and ERA-Interim are not expected to influence the overall crop model
postconflict yield estimates.
Crop Yield Simulations. Six gridded global crop models participated in this
study: EPIC-BOKU (59), GEPIC (60), LPJmL (61), pDSSAT (62, 63), PEPIC (64),
and PROMET (65, 66), as part of the GGCMI (28, 29) within the Agricultural
Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP) (67). Although
some models have descended from the same parent model, different param-
eterization and subroutine selections render each contribution independent
(68). We focus on the four major global grain crops, that is, maize (Zea mays
L.), wheat (Triticum sp. L.), rice (Oryza sativa L.), and soybean (Glycine max
L. Merr.). Wheat is simulated as winter and spring wheat individually; grain
and silage maize are not distinguished. Together these crops contribute 90%
of today’s global caloric production of all cereals (32); herein cereals include
soybean. All crop models simulate the four crops under both rainfed and
irrigated conditions in each grid cell irrespective of current land-use pat-
terns. The physical cropland extent, including irrigated fractions, is applied
in the postprocessing based on the MIRCA2000 (Monthly Irrigated and
Rainfed Crop Areas around the year 2000) reference dataset (69) and is held
constant over time. Crop production is calculated as yield times harvested
area of the respective crop. We omit grid cells with <10 ha cropland area
for each crop. All simulations are carried out at the 0.5◦ global grid.
Crop models are harmonized for 1) planting and maturity dates as in
GGCMI phase 2 (51), 2) spatially explicit fertilizer input as in Elliott et al.
(29), and 3) unconstrained water availability for irrigation (29). The latter
assumes that under irrigation any soil water deficit is practically eliminated
the next day and no conveyance or application losses are withheld. PROMET
simulates potential yields without fertilizer constraints. Soil moisture and
soil temperature for various soil layers are calculated by the crop models in
a transient way, that is, without reinitializing at the beginning of each year.
All models use a classic phenological heat sum approach to determine physi-
ological stages (respective base temperatures are listed in SI Appendix, Table
S1) between planting and maturity. Heat unit accumulation can be modi-
fied by the sensitivity to day length (photoperiod) and for winter wheat it
is stalled until vernalization requirements are reached, that is, the exposure
to cold temperatures before reaching anthesis. Planting dates are constant
across all simulations but the heat sum approach leads to later maturity
dates in colder years. Simulated growing seasons shorter than 50 d result
in the assumption of crop failure. We simulate only one growing season
per calendar year, and since two harvests can occur within the same calen-
dar year (e.g., in regions where harvests are close to the end of year), we
report growing seasons in sequence and not by the calendar year (29). This
may cause disagreement with the reporting of the UN’s FAOSTAT, where
harvest seasons are assigned to the calendar year in which the majority
of the harvest happens. Time series correlation between simulations and
FAOSTAT statistics can therefore be affected, but it occurs only in a small
number of grid cells and it does not affect the simulated SD of yield time
series or simulated postconflict yield impacts (68). To avoid temporal trends
in crop simulations, all model inputs (including land use, atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentrations, NO3 and NH4 deposition rates, and crop cultivars)
except weather are held constant at year 1995 levels, the center of the 1980
to 2010 simulation period. We are not accounting for additional CO2 emis-
sions from fires as they are considered negligible compared to the global
budget (1, 13).
Except LPJmL and PEPIC, which are adjusted to match national yield
observations [1998 to 2007 (32)], none of the models accounts for human
management intervention other than fertilizer application, irrigation, seed
selection, and growing periods. To represent realistic crop production esti-
mates, we calculate fractional yield changes from each individual crop
model between the control and perturbation scenarios and apply these to a
spatially explicit (0.5◦) observational yield reference dataset representative
for the time period 2003 to 2007 (SI Appendix, Fig. S14). SPAM2005 (Spa-
tial Production Allocation Model 2005) (70) is used as the main reference
yield data as it separates rainfed and irrigated systems. Grid cells with miss-
ing SPAM2005 yield data but with >10 ha MIRCA2000 harvested area are
gap filled with Ray et al. (71) yield data; both SPAM2005 and Ray et al. (71)
represent the time period 2003 to 2007.
Historical maize yield ensemble simulations agree well with observations,
especially during extreme years such as 1983, 1988, and 2004 (SI Appendix,
Fig. S7). The observed and simulated yield range and variability are well in
agreement (observed and simulated SDs are 0.187 and 0.181 t/ha, respec-
tively), and the ensemble mean often reproduces observations better than
any individual crop model (SI Appendix, Fig. S15), which underpins the util-
ity of the ensemble. While the models reliably reproduce yield declines
in extreme years, they cannot account for flooding events, which partly
explains, for example, the disagreement in 1993 (SI Appendix, Fig. S7). Addi-
tional evaluation of model performances is presented in SI Appendix, Fig.
S15 and more thoroughly by Mu¨ller et al. (68).
Each model reacts differently to cold temperatures with associated
effects on phenological development, crop growth, grain filling, and phys-
ical damage (see SI Appendix, Table S1 for an overview). In pDSSAT grain
filling is terminated prior to physiological maturity after 5 consecutive days
with insufficient kernel growth rate, which is the case if T < Tbase, the phe-
nological base temperature (63). Additionally, cold temperature mortality
defaults to –25 ◦C, which affects only wheat. PROMET considers frost killing
if temperatures fall below –8 ◦C, except for winter wheat. Frost killing is not
considered during germination and after reaching physiological maturity.
Crop failure is assumed if air temperature falls below the crop-specific base
temperature on more than 14 consecutive days (66). All EPIC-based mod-
els consider biomass reduction for winter crops, depending on crop-specific
frost sensitivity and base temperature. They also account for frost dam-
age, depending on the snow cover. LPJmL and PROMET consider a maximal
length of the growing period at which early harvest is enforced, irrespective
of physiological maturity (SI Appendix, Table S1). GEPIC and PEPIC enforce
early harvest on 1 December (Northern Hemisphere) and 1 June (Southern
Hemisphere). See SI Appendix, Table S1 for additional crop model-specific
details on response mechanisms to cold temperatures.
Wheat, and winter wheat in particular, shows larger uncertainty in the
crop model response to the simulated climate perturbation compared to
maize and soy (Fig. 2 and SI Appendix, Figs. S3 and S4). In large part, this is
due to 1) whether vernalization is considered in a specific model and 2) if
so, the calibration of vernalization parameters is difficult for global simula-
tions; 3) whether frost damage is considered and 4) if so, the calibration of
frost damage parameters can be cultivar specific and therefore difficult to
generalize for a global study; and 5) the effect of snow cover on effective
temperature. Each of these aspects is handled differently in the models, but
is particularly relevant for winter wheat.
EPIC-BOKU cannot provide growing season outputs, and therefore GEPIC
and PEPIC results are used to identify cells with crop failures due to exces-
sive growing season length. GEPIC and EPIC-BOKU use the Hargreaves
method to estimate potential evapotranspiration (59), while PEPIC uses
the Penman–Monteith method (64). All EPIC-based models use the same
core executable (EPICv0810) but differences arise from parameterizations
of crop cultivars, soil attributes, soil nutrient cycling, hydrologic processes,
and field management. See Folberth et al. (72) for additional details and
evaluations.
We calculate crop yield anomalies for simulated and observed data as
detrended (first quadratic polynomial subtracted) and normalized (mean
subtracted) yields based on the entire data record (i.e., simulated yields
1981 to 2009 and observed yields 1961 to 2017). Explained variances (R2,
in percent) are based on the Pearson correlation coefficient derived from
simulated and observed [FAOSTAT (32)] national yield time series and to
quantify residuals we calculate root-mean-square errors.
Food Trade Network. To simulate the global repercussions of the nuclear
conflict-induced food production shock, we use an observational represen-
tation of the global food trade network at the country level (30). Therein,
reduction of national food production is partly absorbed through decreases
in domestic reserves and use and partly transmitted through the adjustment
of trade flow. Through adjustments to trade flows, the effects of the ini-
tial production shock propagate through the global system. Observed data
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from FAOSTAT (32) and the US Department of Agriculture (73) for maize
and wheat in caloric equivalents of food production, reserves, and trade are
averaged from 2006 to 2008 to create a baseline food trade network into
which we introduce simulated crop production anomalies [see Marchand
et al. (30) for more details].
For each country i in the analysis, we define the net supply (Si) of a food
commodity for a given year (y) as
Si,y = Pri,y + Imi,y − Exi,y , [6]
where Pr is domestic production, Im is the sum of all imports, and Ex is the
sum of all exports. Next, we define a change in a country’s reserves (∆R)
over the same time period as
∆Ri,y = Si,y −Ui,y , [7]
where U is defined broadly as domestic use, including any food wasted.
To avoid misinterpretation, we use the term “domestic use” instead of
“domestic consumption,” used in the original publication of the trade net-
work (30). The simulated changes in domestic use are based on generalized
assumptions to fulfill network dependencies and are indicative of con-
straints to national inventories but should not be interpreted as reductions
in individual per capita consumption or potential undernourishment.
Negative values of ∆R mean that reserves are used, while positive val-
ues mean that surplus amounts of a commodity are transferred to storage.
Finally, we define the overall national food commodity inventory (I) as
Ii,y = Si,y + Ri,y . [8]
The trade network is evaluated annually, as crop production anomalies
are at the annual time step. Negative crop production anomalies are
absorbed by first using reserves. If depleted, imports are increased, exports
are blocked, and domestic use is reduced. The simulation ends when all
countries—through reserves, consumption, and trade—are able to absorb
their supply shocks caused by production decreases and trade demands.
We run the trade network analysis for the first 5 postconflict years, based
on average crop production anomalies across the 29 historical years (SI
Appendix, Fig. S1).
STUs, calculated as a country’s reserves relative to initial domestic use,
STUi,y =
Ri,y
Si,initial
, [9]
provide an indication of the resilience of a country and the global food
system to such decreases in production. Comparing the change in STU
pre- and postconflict captures how different the postshock equilibrium is
from the initial state as a result of decreases to reserves around the world
(Fig. 6 and SI Appendix, Table S3). With decreases in reserve stocks, which
buffer the effects of production declines, future production decreases will
be increasingly absorbed through trade, thus affecting more countries, and
through decreases in domestic use.
We focus the food trade network analysis on maize and wheat as they
are the two most important staple crops contributing 69% (2006 to 2008) of
the combined exports of the four crops studied (32). These two crops have
the most reliable observational data available and thus the model of trade
and reserve dynamics is most robust. India and Pakistan are excluded from
the trade network by assuming zero imports and export, to avoid arbitrary
assumptions on changes in food production and demand and to be consis-
tent with the remaining analyses in this study (see SI Appendix, Table S2 for
crop production changes under different assumptions). Yet, removing India
and Pakistan from the initial observation-based trade dependencies creates
reduced import availability in countries that exhibit trade connections with
India and Pakistan. This effect, however, is more important for rice as South
Asia is a large rice exporter. Country population is taken from the Natural
Earth product (74) representing the year 2017 (SI Appendix, Table S3).
The trade network analysis assumes constant food demand over time,
and maize and wheat are evaluated separately without substituting
between crops. The representation of the livestock sector and food prices
is beyond the scope of this study. Exports are banned when reserves
are fully depleted, which is a conservative estimate as some countries
might impose regulatory measures to stabilize domestic markets earlier.
The network does not include such political decisions, including panic buy-
ing, precautionary purchases, and other behavioral responses that would
amplify nonlinearities in the response of the global food trade system.
However, the network is grounded in national observed inventories and
reproduces supply and demand trade flow dynamics (30). It captures critical
interdependencies among countries and provides a framework to study the
short-term, nonlinear, and out-of-equilibrium response of trade networks to
supply shocks.
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Decomposition of crop model responses. The decomposition of yield responses to single climate drivers individually perturbed15
one at a time (filled-in with control AgMERRA climate) highlights that (using maize as an example) SR and P have spatially16
rather homogeneous responses, inducing regional yield decline by 5 to 20% in many world regions (Fig. 5 and S8). T , however,17
causes a strongly localized signal at latitudes >30◦N, with yield declines up to 50%. Cooler temperatures affect high-latitude18
temperature-limited agriculture primarily through slower accumulation of Growing Degree Days (GDD; daily mean temperature19
accumulation above a crop-specific base temperature, see Table S1) and therefore expanded growing period length, which20
can cause failure to reach physiological maturity, and enhance exposure to frost damage (see Table S1 and Fig. S9). In turn,21
slightly cooler temperatures in subtropical and tropical climates are shown to have beneficial effects as long as radiation and22
precipitation are not imposing additional stresses (Fig. S8). It was indeed recently confirmed that aerosol-induced cooling23
increases tropical rice yields (1). At the global level, perturbed T , P , SR, and LR cause maize production declines of 5, 2.5, 3.7,24
and 0.9%, respectively, which indicates that the individual effects are largely additive (combined perturbation -12.1%, Fig. 5).25
The representation of water stress is among the core capabilities of crop models (2), and we find a robust cross-model26
response to precipitation changes in water-limited rainfed systems (PEPIC uses a different potential evapotranspiration (PET)27
estimation method and is thus slightly less sensitive than other EPIC-based models). Yet, there are marked differences in28
the response to T and especially SR (Fig. S8). The global maize production response to ∼1.8◦C decline in global mean T29
ranges from -1.8% (pDSSAT) to -9.6% (PEPIC), while the high-latitude losses are remarkably similar across models. It is the30
disagreement on the lower-latitude gains from cooler temperatures that causes global model differences (pDSSAT shows up to31
∼20% production gains in regions where PEPIC results remain unchanged). As for SR, maize production in LPJmL even32
gains 3% at the global level, while for pDSSAT and GEPIC it is the strongest negative driver (-4.2 and -7.8%, respectively). In33
all models, reduced solar radiation reduces Gross Primary Production (GPP). In LPJmL, however, radiation affects PET and34
thus determines atmospheric water demand. Lower SR therefore reduces crop water stress, which is beneficial for crop growth35
under unchanged temperature and outweighs reductions in GPP at global level. pDSSAT and GEPIC, on the other hand, use36
a radiation-use efficiency model in which GPP is more sensitive to lower radiation influx with immediate adverse responses.37
Longwave radiation is only considered in LPJmL. Despite differences in responses to individual climate drivers and varying38
cold damage implementations, the overall crop model response is largely similar, which adds confidence to the reliability of the39
analysis but also helps to better understand crop model response mechanisms under unprecedented climate anomalies than40
they were designed for (Fig. S8).41
Schauberger et al. (3) show that the GGCMI models reliably reproduce observed yield losses due to extreme heat. A similar42
observational response at global level for cold temperatures has not been established to our knowledge, but the results in this43
study suggest that there is a linear maize yield decline between -1 and -4 ◦C across currently cultivated areas (Fig. S10).44
Largest post-conflict losses occur in different years for different crops. While maize and wheat show largest losses in year45
four, they occur for soybean in year one and for rice in year five (Fig. 2). This is explained by different regional patterns of the46
climate forcing (CF1 vs. CF2) and the different growing areas of each crop. The differences in crop responses between year one47
and four, however, are minor and do not indicate different physiological response pattern of the four crops.48
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Fig. S1. Model workflow and simulation protocol. Climate forcing CF1 (4) and CF2 (5) are published climate model simulations. The following ‘Materials
and Methods’ sections in the main text provide more details: ‘Nuclear conflict scenario’; ‘Climate model simulations with 5 Tg soot emission’; ‘Climate
perturbation protocol for crop model simulations’; ‘Crop yield simulations’; and ‘Food trade network’.
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Fig. S2. Spatial pattern of nuclear conflict-induced climate perturbations. Year 1–5 post-conflict changes in surface air temperature [◦C] (A, B),
precipitation [%] (C, D), and incoming shortwave (E, F) and longwave (G, H) solar radiation [%] are shown for the CF1 (left column) and CF2 (right
column) climate model simulations as averages across three ensemble members.
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Fig. S3. Implications for winter wheat production. Same as Figure 3 but for winter wheat.
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Fig. S4. Implications for spring wheat production. Same as Figure 3 but for spring wheat.
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Fig. S5. Implications for rice production. Same as Figure 3 but for rice.
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Fig. S6. Implications for soybean production. Same as Figure 3 but for soybean.
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Fig. S7. Baseline and perturbed historical maize yield variability. To address interannual differences, each post-conflict year of climate anomalies is simulated for 29 years
of historical weather observation. (A) The figure shows mean global maize yields for this historical time period from 1981 – 2009 for the post-conflict year four (dashed line;
the post-conflict year with largest global maize losses), along with the baseline ensemble simulations (black solid line), as well as detrended FAOSTAT yield observations
(gray solid line (6)). The standard deviation (SD) of observed and simulated historical baseline yields is indicated in the top right corner. Simulated yields are shown as the
area-weighted mean across rainfed and irrigated systems and crop models (and climate models in the perturbed case). FAOSTAT yield observations are available from 1961 to
2017, shown on the compressed x-axes outside of the simulation period. Panel B highlights the relative change between the baseline and the perturbation shown in A. There is
no statistically significant trend (p<0.25) in the impacts over the historical time period (neither in the absolute yields nor relative changes).
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Fig. S8. Maize yield and production sensitivity to individually perturbed climate drivers, shown by crop model. (A–Y) Similar to Figure 5, yield
and production changes for maize are shown for each climate driver perturbed one at a time (rows), but here separated for each crop model (columns).
Percentage numbers in the title indicate the respective global caloric production change. This sensitivity test is only performed for climate model simulation
CF1a, and by the crop models EPIC-BOKU, GEPIC, LPJmL, pDSSAT, and PEPIC.
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Fig. S9. Climate perturbation effects on the growing season length. (A–T) Histograms of the simulated growing season length are shown for maize,
wheat, rice, and soybean (rows) and crop models (columns); for the control simulation and several post-conflict perturbation years (colors). Triangles
along the x-axis and legend inserts indicate the respective median growing season length. The dashed vertical line illustrates the crop-specific maximal
growing season length, if applicable. Data are shown for latitudes >30◦N. The number of grid cells behind each histogram is shown in the top corner (n,
average across all 7 simulations). Rainfed and irrigated systems are combined as weighted averages based on current cropland extent. The crop model
EPIC-BOKU is not shown as it cannot provide growing season outputs.
Jägermeyr et al. 11 of 29
Fig. S10. Temperature response function of crop yields. Yield changes between post-conflict year 1 to 5 are plotted against the local annual mean
temperature change for maize, wheat, rice, and soybean, separated for CF1 and CF2 climate anomalies. Lines illustrate the respective LOWESS curve
(locally weighted scatterplot smoothing; with span = 0.7 and degree = 1). Data are shown for all grid cells with more than 10 ha cropland (7). Yield
changes are based on perturbations of all climate inputs, not on isolated temperature perturbations such as shown in Figure S8.
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Fig. S11. Decomposition of crop model and climate input uncertainty. Colored squares mark the overall mean perturbation response of global caloric
production for the four crops and the total, shown as the 5-year post-conflict average (rainfed and irrigated combined). Both axes are identical, but the
error bars separate the range of i) crop model responses (x-axis; as the mean across the climate model ensemble and historical years), ii) climate model
ensemble (y-axis, error bars with right-hand whiskers; as the mean across crop models and historical years), iii) sensitivity of historical years (y-axis, error
bars with left-hand whiskers; as the mean across crop model and climate model ensembles). See Figure S7 for the time series of historical years and the
range of maize responses.
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Fig. S12. Post-conflict changes in national maize reserves and domestic use. Same as Figure 6 but for maize only and for post-conflict years one to
five.
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Fig. S13. Post-conflict changes in national wheat reserves and domestic use. Same as Figure 6 but for wheat only and for post-conflict years one to
five.
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Fig. S14. Gridded yield reference data used in this study. (A–L) Observational reference yield data are shown for each crop (row) and the reference
data set SPAM2005 (8) (first column), Ray et al. (9) (second column), and a composite of both (third column), each representative for the time period 2003
– 2007, respectively. The composite yield product is primarily based on SPAM2005, gap-filled with Ray et al. data in case data are missing. Black areas
indicate grid cells with missing values, but with more than 10 ha cropland area in the MIRCA2000 data set (7).
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Fig. S15. Evaluation of observed and simulated yield variability. (A–I) Country-level time series of detrended maize yield anomalies from FAOSTAT
reference data (6) are plotted against crop model simulations for selected countries (large producer countries at higher latitudes). Simulations are shown
for each crop model individually and for the ensemble mean. Pearson’s correlation coefficients [%] are indicated at the top of each plot (significance: ***,
p<0.001; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1; n.s., not significant) and the root-mean-square error (RMSE) of absolute yield anomalies in parenthesis.
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Supplementary Tables50
Table S1. Overview of participating Global Gridded Crop Models. The key references, simulations performed, phenological base temperatures, and
response mechanisms to cold temperature exposure are detailed for each crop model. Codes for the simulations are: CF1 and CF2 climate forcing with
ensemble members a–c (CF1a,b,c and CF2a,b,c) each for 15 post-conflict years and 31 historical years (see Fig. S1), climate sensitivity runs based on
CF1a using only perturbed temperature, precipitation, shortwave, or longwave radiation, respectively (CF1a-T, CF1a-P, CF1a-SR, CF1a-LW), all models
also provided the historical control simulation. Crop codes: maize (mai), winter wheat (wwh), spring wheat (swh), wheat (whe, if wwh and swh share the
same parameter value), rice (ric), and soybean (soy). All temperatures are in ◦C. NH and SH refer to Northern and Southern Hemisphere, respectively.
Model name Ref. Simulations
performed
Base temperature
phenological de-
velopment
Early harvest and response mechanisms to cold temperature
EPIC-BOKU (En-
vironmental Policy
Integrated Climate
Universität für Bo-
denkultur Wien)
(10) CF1a,b,c, CF2a,b,c,
CF1a-T, CF1a-P,
CF1a-SR
Mai 8, wwh 0, swh
5, ric 10, soy 10
Cold damage function, depending on snow cover and crop frost
sensitivity, crop failures due to early harvest adapted from GEPIC and
PEPIC, otherwise early harvest on 31 December NH and 31 June SH
GEPIC (GIS-
based Environ-
mental Policy
Integrated Cli-
mate)
(11) CF1a,b,c, CF2a,b,c,
CF1a-T, CF1a-P,
CF1a-SR
Mai 8, wwh 0, swh
5, ric 10, soy 10
Cold damage function, depending on snow cover and crop frost
sensitivity, early harvest on 1 December NH and 1 June SH
LPJmL (Lund-
Potsdam-Jena
with managed
Land)
(12) CF1a,b,c, CF2a,b,c,
CF1a-T, CF1a-
P, CF1a-SR,
CF1a-LW
Mai 5–151, whe 0
, ric 10, soy 10
Max. growing season length: 240 for mai, soy, swh, 330 for wwh, 220
for ric, which triggers early harvest
pDSSAT (pSIMS
platform Decision
Support System
for Agrotechnol-
ogy Transfer)
(13, 14) CF1a,b,c, CF2a,b,c,
CF1a-T, CF1a-P,
CF1a-SR
Mai 8, whe 0, ric 9,
soy -15–72
Early harvest if T ≤ Tbase for ≥ 5 days, leaf damage starts to occur
if T<6 (only maize), 50% of the plant is killed if T<-6 (unhardened
seedling; only wheat), plant is killed when fully hardened if T<-25
(only wheat)
PEPIC (Python-
based Environ-
mental Policy
Integrated Cli-
mate)
(15) CF1a,b,c, CF2a,b,c,
CF1a-T, CF1a-P,
CF1a-SR
Mai 8, wwh 0, swh
5, ric 10, soy 10
Cold damage function, depending on snow cover and crop frost
sensitivity, early harvest on 1 December NH and 1 June SH
PROMET (Pro-
cesses of Mass
and Energy
Transfer)
(16, 17) CF1a,b,c, CF2a,b,c Mai 8, wwh 0–82 ,
swh 0, ric 12–152,
soy 15–173
Plant killing if T<-8, except for wwh and not during germination or
after maturity; crop failure if T<Tb for ≥14 consecutive days, max.
growing season length: 240 all crops, except 360 for wwh, which
triggers early harvest
1depending on local mean annual temperature; 2depending on phenological stage; 3depending on vegetative or reproductive stage
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Table S2. Global crop production changes under different assumptions for India and Pakistan. As in Figure 2, relative changes [%] (five-year
post-conflict average) in global caloric production from maize, wheat, rice, soybean, and their total are shown for combined, rainfed, and irrigated
production, respectively. Here, changes are separated for three different assumptions regarding the contribution of India and Pakistan to the global sum, i)
included in both control and perturbation (column “included”), ii) masked from both control and perturbation (“masked”; same as throughout the analyses
in this study), and iii) included under the assumption that their production falls to zero after the war (“failure”). Data are shown for the crop and climate
model ensemble mean. The column “share” lists the crops’ respective fraction of total global caloric production of cereals, including soybean.
Crop Share Combined Rainfed Irrigated
included masked failure included masked failure included masked failure
Maize 35 -12 -13 -14 -15 -15 -16 -5 -6 -9
Wheat 24 -10 -11 -22 -11 -11 -12 -7 -10 -42
Rice 21 -3 -3 -22 -4 -3 -27 -3 -3 -20
Soybean 10 -16 -17 -20 -17 -17 -21 -13 -13 -14
Total 90 -10 -11 -19 -13 -13 -16 -5 -6 -23
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Table S3. Country-level changes in maize and wheat production, reserves, and use. In declining order of production change, the table lists for maize
and wheat in each country: the post-conflict year in which maximum changes occur, mean changes in caloric crop production (%, largest post-conflict
change), maximum changes in any individual historical years (%), stocks-to-use ratios (STU) for the initial and post-conflict year one and four, the initial
domestic use (104 kcal/cap, sum of maize and wheat), changes in domestic use in post-conflict year one and four (%), mean changes in domestic use
between year 1–5, and the population (2017 level). The cumulative population of countries with production declines exceeding 10, 20, and 30%, zero STU
levels, and domestic use declines exceeding 10, 20, and 30%, respectively, are presented at the end of the table. India and Pakistan are excluded.
Country Kcal change STU STU STU Use Use Use Use Population
year mean max. initial year 1 year 4 initial year 1 year 4 year 1–5 current
(104 mean
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) kcal/cap) (%) (%) (%) (million)
Belarus 2 -59.5 -79.8 22.0 8.6 0.0 63.5 0.0 -27.0 -19.9 10
Netherlands 2 -54.5 -75.4 1.8 0.0 0.0 173.2 -0.3 -37.2 -20.8 17
Germany 2 -48.8 -73.7 12.9 0.4 0.0 88.4 -0.2 -9.1 -5.9 81
Poland 4 -44.5 -56.5 10.7 0.0 0.0 83.0 -1.4 -35.2 -20.2 38
Switzerland 2 -38.0 -58.7 17.8 12.2 0.0 56.2 -0.5 -44.9 -22.1 8
Belgium 2 -37.7 -56.7 6.9 2.1 0.0 109.5 -0.1 -8.3 -5.3 11
Mauritania 3 -36.6 -51.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 27.5 -0.4 -38.0 -19.0 4
Slovenia 2 -36.1 -61.3 7.1 1.2 0.0 112.8 0.0 -22.6 -11.5 2
Czech Republic 4 -34.0 -47.4 14.5 0.0 0.0 102.8 -0.6 -20.2 -6.1 11
Ukraine 4 -32.5 -47.9 14.8 0.0 0.0 133.6 -1.0 -10.8 -6.3 44
Austria 2 -32.3 -50.3 12.4 0.0 0.0 109.5 -0.3 -8.7 -8.0 9
Canada 4 -29.3 -50.4 35.9 16.2 0.0 127.1 -12.3 -31.8 -24.4 36
Russia 2 -29.2 -36.9 14.1 1.7 0.0 96.4 -3.6 -7.9 -6.7 142
Latvia 3 -28.9 -54.1 17.9 0.0 0.0 73.8 -1.9 -10.0 -8.3 2
Denmark 3 -26.1 -41.3 11.7 0.0 0.0 252.3 -1.4 -11.2 -8.2 6
Slovakia 2 -25.4 -46.1 13.6 0.0 0.0 109.9 -0.7 -20.9 -7.6 5
Moldova 2 -23.5 -52.8 26.6 15.4 0.0 155.1 0.0 -16.9 -10.0 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 -22.0 -48.3 17.9 22.5 0.0 131.0 0.0 -29.8 -13.3 4
Kazakhstan 2 -20.2 -32.8 49.3 12.4 0.0 74.5 0.0 -3.2 -3.0 19
Macedonia 2 -19.6 -29.0 9.9 16.2 0.0 98.0 0.0 -41.2 -17.6 2
Turkey 4 -19.6 -23.0 10.5 25.6 0.0 86.2 0.0 -18.7 -4.9 81
Tunisia 4 -18.6 -26.7 22.5 16.9 0.0 87.9 -0.5 -49.3 -24.6 11
United States 1 -18.6 -37.0 18.5 3.0 0.0 244.7 -1.0 -2.3 -1.8 327
Botswana 1 -18.5 -26.2 102.9 73.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -5.6 2
Eritrea 4 -18.1 -29.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 -0.2 -64.8 -33.1 6
Lithuania 3 -18.0 -28.5 19.3 0.0 0.0 77.3 -0.4 -9.1 -7.2 3
Uganda 3 -17.9 -26.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 14.8 -6.2 -12.9 -8.4 40
Kyrgyzstan 2 -17.3 -29.7 19.1 11.8 0.0 76.0 -3.9 -21.1 -14.2 6
Namibia 2 -17.2 -23.9 2.6 0.8 0.0 16.2 0.0 -13.8 -11.3 2
Serbia 2 -17.1 -42.6 19.9 32.3 0.0 253.0 0.0 -3.3 -1.5 7
Armenia 2 -17.0 -24.0 5.6 1.4 0.0 53.4 -2.4 -56.8 -38.6 3
Japan 4 -17.0 -21.4 10.8 5.4 0.0 55.4 -21.3 -70.0 -49.9 126
Georgia 3 -16.4 -29.5 23.5 17.6 0.0 59.9 -0.1 -54.8 -31.1 5
France 4 -16.1 -28.7 19.4 13.3 0.0 121.0 0.0 -3.2 -1.9 67
Greece 4 -16.1 -20.4 8.8 10.7 0.0 162.1 0.0 -18.8 -8.2 11
Iran 4 -15.4 -18.4 27.1 23.8 1.9 59.0 0.0 -14.6 -7.3 82
Laos 2 -14.9 -21.0 30.2 30.2 30.1 26.4 0.0 -1.0 -0.4 7
Tajikistan 3 -14.9 -19.0 5.7 5.7 0.0 59.1 -0.1 -20.2 -16.3 8
United Kingdom 4 -14.6 -21.9 11.2 0.0 0.0 72.2 -0.1 -9.5 -4.4 65
Bulgaria 4 -13.9 -28.5 15.1 20.1 0.0 149.7 0.0 -2.8 -1.3 7
South Africa 3 -13.8 -18.0 15.2 4.6 0.0 67.3 -0.1 -1.8 -2.9 55
Myanmar (Burma) 2 -13.7 -20.9 2.4 0.2 0.0 8.4 -7.8 -8.4 -8.3 55
Chad 1 -13.6 -20.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 -10.4 -5.6 12
North Korea 4 -13.1 -20.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.9 -0.1 -11.2 -6.2 25
Afghanistan 3 -13.0 -17.5 0.0 0.8 1.3 43.3 -0.5 -16.7 -12.6 34
El Salvador 2 -12.8 -17.2 16.5 3.9 0.0 65.0 -4.5 -35.7 -25.8 6
Uzbekistan 5 -12.8 -16.3 12.0 10.4 0.5 71.7 0.0 -16.6 -11.3 30
Australia 4 -12.6 -17.2 50.3 26.2 0.0 52.6 0.0 -4.0 -1.6 23
Mongolia 1 -12.5 -19.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.8 -0.6 -48.9 -29.6 3
Sweden 2 -12.3 -34.1 14.2 0.0 0.0 50.5 -0.5 -3.6 -3.2 10
China 3 -12.1 -15.4 30.2 22.9 0.0 47.0 0.0 -10.1 -4.5 1379
Niger 1 -12.0 -31.9 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.2 -1.3 -49.4 -26.1 19
Turkmenistan 4 -11.9 -19.4 54.8 54.8 41.3 56.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 5
Rwanda 3 -11.7 -18.5 2.7 0.0 0.0 6.1 -3.6 -34.9 -24.4 12
Montenegro 2 -11.6 -36.3 0.0 12.9 0.0 9.7 -0.2 -63.8 -28.1 1
Hungary 4 -11.4 -30.4 20.0 4.5 0.0 187.8 -0.2 -2.8 -1.8 10
Lesotho 3 -11.4 -23.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2 -2.6 -6.0 -4.7 2
New Zealand 4 -11.3 -14.2 23.6 20.6 0.0 50.4 0.0 -12.1 -5.1 5
Syria 4 -11.0 -16.7 76.7 68.6 0.0 21.2 -0.4 -28.7 -17.6 18
Zimbabwe 2 -10.9 -15.0 1.8 1.6 0.0 52.3 -0.6 -6.9 -15.9 14
Ecuador 3 -10.6 -13.2 11.4 3.7 0.0 33.3 -0.6 -27.5 -17.4 16
Mozambique 2 -10.6 -16.8 4.3 0.0 0.0 22.5 -0.5 -7.5 -9.1 27
Italy 3 -10.5 -26.5 8.3 8.3 0.0 119.5 0.0 -14.3 -5.7 62
Lebanon 2 -10.2 -14.7 2.8 0.0 0.0 36.2 -4.1 -63.9 -36.9 6
Burkina Faso 1 -10.0 -15.9 3.7 0.0 0.4 15.4 -2.2 -5.2 -3.4 20
Guatemala 2 -10.0 -13.8 14.5 5.4 0.0 56.3 -4.4 -29.4 -20.8 15
Croatia 3 -9.7 -41.9 11.6 19.0 0.0 198.5 0.0 -1.9 -0.8 4
Indonesia 4 -9.6 -12.2 13.2 6.8 0.0 22.8 -0.1 -16.7 -6.4 261
Kenya 3 -9.6 -17.5 15.7 8.4 0.0 24.7 0.0 -8.6 -6.4 48
Romania 4 -9.4 -19.5 11.6 13.0 0.0 171.8 0.0 -6.8 -1.7 22
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Peru 4 -9.3 -11.3 10.4 6.7 0.0 44.7 0.0 -15.8 -8.0 31
Burundi 1 -9.0 -15.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 -21.1 -25.5 -23.6 11
Portugal 3 -9.0 -21.4 2.6 1.5 0.0 106.3 0.0 -31.7 -17.5 11
Zambia 2 -9.0 -13.3 14.9 1.7 0.0 25.7 0.0 -2.1 -1.4 16
Spain 3 -8.9 -18.8 5.9 5.6 0.0 123.5 0.0 -22.6 -12.0 49
Albania 4 -8.8 -19.2 2.4 2.2 0.0 97.1 0.0 -43.0 -21.1 3
Malawi 2 -7.8 -14.6 22.2 11.1 0.0 40.2 0.0 -2.0 -1.4 19
Paraguay 4 -6.9 -13.6 104.1 80.0 0.0 -1.8 0.0 -2.1 -1.2 7
Algeria 3 -6.8 -19.9 26.2 21.0 0.0 59.4 -0.1 -33.2 -16.2 41
South Korea 5 -6.7 -12.1 21.7 7.5 0.0 63.6 -0.8 -73.2 -41.2 51
Tanzania, U.R. of 3 -6.6 -10.1 12.1 6.3 0.0 26.9 0.0 -6.2 -4.1 54
Costa Rica 2 -6.5 -9.1 16.2 7.4 0.0 49.8 -22.7 -71.3 -53.7 5
Mexico 1 -6.2 -11.3 10.7 1.3 0.0 94.8 -4.1 -22.7 -17.0 125
Vietnam 1 -6.0 -9.7 11.8 6.1 0.0 18.3 0.0 -11.4 -4.9 96
Jordan 4 -5.8 -13.3 44.0 35.9 0.0 22.0 -0.5 -74.2 -32.2 10
D.R. Congo 4 -5.7 -11.2 3.3 2.0 0.0 6.7 -0.3 -16.7 -10.6 83
Argentina 3 -5.5 -8.4 27.9 3.7 0.0 59.5 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 44
Sri Lanka 1 -5.5 -9.0 30.4 30.0 0.0 11.2 0.0 -13.1 -4.4 22
Swaziland 1 -5.4 -14.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 -0.6 -1.1 -4.0 1
Cambodia 4 -5.0 -8.4 9.7 10.2 1.8 10.7 0.0 -2.6 -1.1 16
Ethiopia 1 -4.8 -10.0 8.2 4.0 0.0 19.6 0.0 -4.8 -2.5 105
Nicaragua 2 -4.8 -8.8 6.6 0.0 0.0 40.6 -3.1 -26.1 -17.7 6
Brazil 1 -4.8 -6.8 17.6 11.0 0.0 78.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 207
Bhutan 3 -4.5 -10.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 3.5 0.0 -2.1 -2.5 1
Malaysia 5 -4.3 -12.5 28.6 26.1 0.0 23.9 0.0 -24.8 -10.5 31
Uruguay 1 -4.3 -13.3 42.4 36.0 2.1 91.8 0.0 -1.9 -0.6 3
Chile 3 -4.2 -8.9 11.6 6.2 0.0 87.2 0.0 -8.2 -5.0 18
Nepal 1 -3.9 -10.6 4.1 0.9 3.2 37.3 -1.2 -2.8 -3.4 29
Bolivia 5 -3.7 -6.3 16.7 14.7 0.0 33.7 0.0 -3.1 -1.1 11
Saudi Arabia 4 -3.5 -6.0 53.8 48.9 34.8 25.3 0.0 -18.2 -11.6 29
Thailand 4 -3.3 -12.3 20.5 20.8 0.0 18.5 0.0 -5.7 -2.2 68
Cuba 2 -3.1 -4.6 3.5 0.0 0.0 54.5 -9.0 -50.3 -33.0 11
Senegal 3 -3.0 -9.6 6.0 6.0 0.0 15.3 0.0 -14.5 -6.3 15
Colombia 2 -2.8 -8.2 20.5 2.2 0.0 36.6 -0.3 -46.8 -31.2 48
Iraq 4 -2.6 -8.6 10.6 10.5 0.0 43.5 0.0 -25.4 -10.7 39
Panama 5 -2.3 -3.7 15.6 0.0 0.0 48.6 -10.1 -65.4 -46.5 4
Venezuela 5 -2.3 -4.8 10.6 5.0 0.0 47.9 0.0 -19.8 -12.2 31
Bangladesh 1 -2.2 -4.7 14.7 15.1 2.4 6.2 0.0 -29.4 -14.5 158
Honduras 5 -2.2 -4.8 13.1 0.0 0.0 40.9 -5.6 -38.4 -27.1 9
Libya 1 -1.9 -10.1 8.2 4.7 0.0 100.6 -0.6 -66.5 -35.1 7
Azerbaijan 5 -1.7 -5.8 25.0 28.1 0.0 74.6 -0.3 -28.8 -15.3 10
Haiti 5 -1.7 -5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.8 -0.9 -21.8 -13.5 11
Nigeria 1 -1.6 -3.4 3.3 2.2 2.6 18.4 0.0 -6.9 -4.2 191
Dominican Republic 5 -1.5 -4.2 9.9 2.1 0.0 47.1 -21.9 -71.9 -52.9 11
Angola 5 -1.2 -4.0 1.6 1.3 0.0 14.7 0.0 -23.8 -13.1 29
Cyprus 3 -1.0 -4.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 106.7 -0.7 -66.6 -29.8 1
Philippines 2 -1.0 -3.6 13.0 12.5 3.3 27.3 0.0 -10.5 -5.1 104
Ghana 5 -0.3 -7.8 6.3 6.4 10.8 19.5 0.0 -6.8 -3.1 27
Cameroon 1 0.2 -2.3 8.2 7.8 17.6 21.6 0.0 -6.0 -2.7 25
Morocco 1 0.3 -17.9 20.7 18.5 0.0 68.3 -0.2 -17.8 -9.6 34
Somalia 3 0.6 -1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2 -0.1 -48.6 -32.9 8
Egypt 1 1.6 -1.5 18.7 14.8 0.0 78.0 0.0 -26.3 -13.3 97
Benin 4 1.8 -5.4 2.7 9.0 22.2 30.8 0.0 -3.2 -1.5 11
Gambia, The 1 1.9 -8.7 0.0 3.1 13.9 14.8 0.0 -53.3 -20.2 2
Yemen 1 1.9 -1.3 9.0 7.9 0.0 28.7 0.0 -32.1 -16.4 28
Mali 2 4.0 -6.5 4.5 11.6 23.8 15.8 0.0 -8.2 -4.1 18
Sudan 4 4.7 -2.4 5.6 9.0 0.0 17.6 -0.4 -17.5 -5.8 37
Israel 3 5.1 -10.4 10.6 5.8 0.0 109.3 -1.3 -66.6 -39.4 8
Central African Republic 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 -0.1 -10.5 -5.4 6
Congo-Brazzaville 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4 -0.1 -32.4 -18.2 5
Djibouti 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 71.1 -0.2 -61.6 -29.6 1
Equatorial Guinea 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 0.0 -51.6 -27.7 1
Estonia 0 0.0 0.0 11.7 9.0 0.0 71.6 -0.2 -6.8 -5.2 1
Finland 0 0.0 0.0 11.3 9.7 0.0 42.0 0.0 -1.6 -1.1 5
Gabon 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.0 0.0 -24.7 -11.9 2
Guinea 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.1 -0.1 -10.1 -4.0 12
Guinea-Bissau 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 0.0 -22.2 -10.9 2
Guyana 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.6 -11.0 -49.2 -32.7 1
Ireland 0 0.0 0.0 5.0 3.9 0.0 123.9 -0.2 -38.8 -23.1 5
Ivory Coast 0 0.0 0.0 3.4 3.0 0.0 13.3 0.0 -7.4 -2.7 24
Jamaica 0 0.0 0.0 8.7 5.1 0.0 66.1 -14.8 -53.0 -36.5 3
Kuwait 0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 61.5 -0.1 -27.6 -13.8 3
Liberia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 -54.3 -21.5 5
Luxembourg 0 0.0 0.0 9.3 7.8 0.0 53.9 0.0 -8.7 -5.8 1
Madagascar 0 0.0 0.0 3.2 3.2 2.1 7.4 0.0 -7.9 -4.1 25
Norway 0 0.0 0.0 43.5 38.4 0.0 31.1 0.0 -31.1 -16.9 5
Oman 0 0.0 0.0 16.0 13.8 0.0 20.0 -0.8 -20.8 -8.4 3
Papua New Guinea 0 0.0 0.0 16.1 16.1 0.0 8.0 0.0 -10.2 -5.0 7
Sierra Leone 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 -30.1 -16.8 6
Suriname 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.1 -18.8 -83.9 -57.8 1
Togo 0 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.7 5.1 27.2 0.0 -5.1 -2.2 8
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0.0 0.0 15.0 2.6 0.0 61.7 -5.9 -51.6 -36.1 1
United Arab Emirates 0 0.0 0.0 7.2 6.5 0.0 60.8 -0.4 -26.5 -11.3 6
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Global 4 -13.4 -20.7 19.6 10.9 0.4 61.8 -1.2 -13.0 -7.5 5835
Population in countries with:
>30% kcal change 235
>20% kcal change 452
>10% kcal change 3,184
STUinit = 0 182
STUyear1 = 0 474
STUyear4 = 0 5,007
Useyear1 < -10% 198
Useyear4 < -10% 3,858
Useyear4 < -20% 1,272
Useyear4 < -30% 595
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Table S4. Country-level changes in maize production, reserves, and use. Same as Table S3, but for maize only.
Country Kcal change STU STU STU Use Use Use Use Population
year mean max. initial year 1 year 4 initial year 1 year 4 year 1–5 current
(104 mean
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) kcal/cap) (%) (%) (%) (million)
Belarus 2 -61.7 -83.5 37.9 6.1 0.0 13.6 0.0 -68.7 -51.9 10
Poland 2 -58.5 -74.6 8.4 0.0 0.0 17.0 -1.6 -44.3 -32.2 38
Russia 2 -57.8 -72.3 2.5 0.0 0.0 11.9 -33.0 -52.3 -49.2 142
Netherlands 2 -55.2 -77.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 64.8 -0.4 -43.5 -29.5 17
Germany 2 -52.2 -77.4 8.4 0.0 0.0 20.5 -1.0 -33.7 -21.1 81
Belgium 2 -48.3 -73.1 6.5 0.0 0.0 33.2 -0.4 -14.2 -9.5 11
Canada 4 -43.3 -65.9 12.5 0.0 0.0 107.8 -19.9 -47.8 -37.9 36
Switzerland 2 -43.2 -66.6 4.2 0.0 0.0 21.8 -1.5 -54.4 -32.7 8
Czech Republic 2 -41.6 -67.7 14.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 -0.6 -4.2 -6.6 11
Austria 2 -38.9 -61.9 11.3 0.0 0.0 69.5 -0.5 -10.7 -10.9 9
Ukraine 2 -38.3 -61.9 12.4 0.0 0.0 46.9 -1.4 -16.0 -11.2 44
Mauritania 3 -36.6 -51.7 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.9 -3.4 0.0 -8.0 4
Slovenia 2 -36.1 -61.3 7.9 0.0 0.0 67.3 0.0 -12.6 -9.0 2
Slovakia 2 -26.9 -57.1 14.8 0.0 0.0 36.5 -0.7 -2.3 -2.4 5
France 2 -26.2 -53.2 16.6 6.7 0.0 41.0 0.0 -3.8 -2.8 67
Macedonia 2 -25.9 -53.2 7.2 25.4 0.0 36.5 0.0 -26.4 -16.7 2
Eritrea 4 -25.8 -39.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -4.0 -3.0 6
Moldova 2 -25.3 -58.3 18.1 8.6 0.0 112.3 0.0 -13.9 -11.1 3
Kyrgyzstan 1 -23.4 -44.9 11.8 0.0 0.0 24.7 -13.0 -19.9 -16.2 6
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 -22.0 -48.3 11.0 19.5 0.0 90.2 0.0 -15.3 -10.7 4
United States 1 -20.8 -41.4 15.9 0.0 0.0 224.8 -1.1 -2.3 -1.8 327
Botswana 1 -20.6 -29.3 70.4 50.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 -0.7 -3.8 2
Armenia 5 -20.5 -32.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 -17.6 -66.6 -57.5 3
Georgia 3 -19.0 -36.7 13.4 0.0 0.0 21.0 -0.3 -16.7 -13.4 5
Uganda 3 -17.9 -26.2 1.9 0.0 0.0 13.5 -6.8 -8.7 -6.4 40
Namibia 2 -17.2 -23.9 4.6 1.4 0.0 8.9 0.0 -7.4 -11.0 2
Serbia 2 -17.1 -43.6 15.5 31.5 0.0 199.9 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 7
Niger 1 -16.5 -40.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 -4.6 -15.1 -9.0 19
South Africa 3 -16.3 -22.4 14.2 0.0 0.0 50.6 -0.1 -0.2 -3.1 55
Myanmar (Burma) 2 -15.4 -23.1 2.9 0.0 0.0 7.0 -9.4 -7.1 -8.6 55
New Zealand 4 -15.1 -34.8 9.1 9.2 0.0 15.5 0.0 -14.4 -6.9 5
Laos 2 -14.9 -21.1 30.5 30.5 30.4 26.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7
Lesotho 3 -14.5 -26.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.4 -2.7 -6.3 -4.9 2
Zimbabwe 2 -13.7 -19.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 48.6 -0.7 -5.6 -16.6 14
Chad 1 -13.6 -20.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 -2.3 -1.7 12
North Korea 4 -13.4 -21.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.4 -0.1 -6.1 -3.3 25
El Salvador 2 -12.8 -17.2 13.6 0.0 0.0 62.1 -4.9 -37.9 -27.5 6
Italy 3 -12.8 -36.5 8.8 7.4 0.0 61.4 0.0 -12.0 -6.8 62
Bulgaria 4 -11.8 -30.7 12.0 36.9 0.0 53.0 0.0 -2.1 -1.1 7
Rwanda 3 -11.7 -18.5 4.4 0.0 0.0 3.7 -5.8 -10.7 -10.2 12
Nepal 2 -11.5 -22.5 7.3 0.0 0.0 20.3 -2.2 -4.9 -6.0 29
Saudi Arabia 5 -11.1 -25.7 17.9 0.0 0.0 20.1 -0.1 -40.6 -25.9 29
Greece 3 -10.9 -20.9 8.8 10.2 0.0 93.9 0.0 -13.2 -7.6 11
Ecuador 3 -10.7 -13.3 10.5 0.0 0.0 24.2 -0.9 -28.2 -19.8 16
Azerbaijan 5 -10.6 -17.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 6.4 -5.0 -19.8 -19.8 10
Mozambique 2 -10.6 -16.8 5.5 0.0 0.0 17.6 -0.7 -1.9 -7.5 27
Montenegro 2 -10.3 -45.7 0.0 60.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 1
Hungary 3 -10.2 -35.8 21.4 8.0 0.0 104.2 0.0 -1.1 -1.3 10
Japan 2 -10.1 -17.1 6.8 0.0 0.0 42.3 -29.2 -87.7 -65.1 126
Burkina Faso 1 -10.0 -15.9 4.0 0.0 0.4 13.9 -2.4 0.0 -0.8 20
Guatemala 2 -10.0 -13.8 11.3 0.0 0.0 47.3 -5.4 -30.8 -23.1 15
Australia 4 -9.9 -14.7 9.3 5.9 0.0 5.0 0.0 -12.9 -3.7 23
Croatia 3 -9.7 -43.9 11.1 23.6 0.0 149.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 4
Indonesia 4 -9.6 -12.2 8.3 0.0 0.0 18.2 -0.1 -12.4 -5.1 261
Kenya 3 -9.6 -17.5 15.0 5.9 0.0 19.0 0.0 -0.8 -3.0 48
Peru 4 -9.3 -11.3 7.7 2.4 0.0 30.4 0.0 -16.5 -9.4 31
Zambia 2 -9.3 -13.6 15.2 0.6 0.0 23.3 0.0 -0.8 -0.9 16
Burundi 1 -9.0 -15.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 -23.1 -24.2 -23.2 11
Portugal 3 -8.8 -22.2 3.5 2.6 0.0 60.1 0.0 -17.2 -10.4 11
Spain 3 -8.0 -26.2 4.3 7.7 0.0 61.1 0.0 -16.9 -9.9 49
Malawi 2 -7.8 -14.6 22.7 11.3 0.0 38.9 0.0 -1.2 -1.0 19
Morocco 4 -7.8 -25.4 8.9 0.0 0.0 17.2 -1.1 -44.0 -30.4 34
China 4 -7.4 -11.0 25.1 18.3 0.0 30.5 0.0 -8.4 -3.0 1379
Albania 3 -7.3 -22.6 0.0 4.4 0.0 33.5 0.0 -12.4 -8.2 3
Turkey 4 -7.1 -20.9 13.5 34.1 0.0 17.8 0.0 -18.4 -4.5 81
Mexico 1 -7.0 -12.4 11.3 0.0 0.0 80.2 -4.8 -26.4 -19.8 125
Paraguay 4 -6.9 -13.6 74.3 31.9 0.0 6.4 0.0 -3.8 -1.9 7
South Korea 5 -6.7 -12.3 18.6 0.0 0.0 49.6 -1.1 -84.0 -49.0 51
Tanzania, U.R. of 3 -6.6 -10.1 13.2 6.9 0.0 24.2 0.0 -4.0 -3.3 54
Costa Rica 2 -6.5 -9.1 10.8 0.0 0.0 43.1 -27.9 -86.6 -65.2 5
Vietnam 1 -6.0 -9.7 8.8 1.8 0.0 15.4 0.0 -5.3 -2.7 96
D.R. Congo 4 -5.7 -11.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 5.2 -0.4 -8.5 -7.2 83
Argentina 3 -5.5 -10.5 26.6 0.9 0.0 34.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.7 44
Sri Lanka 1 -5.5 -9.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 1.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 22
Swaziland 1 -5.4 -14.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 -0.6 -1.1 -4.0 1
Cambodia 4 -5.0 -8.4 10.2 10.8 1.9 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16
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Bolivia 4 -4.8 -7.8 17.1 14.3 0.0 23.2 0.0 -2.6 -0.8 11
Nicaragua 2 -4.8 -8.8 8.0 0.0 0.0 32.9 -3.7 -23.0 -17.2 6
Romania 3 -4.7 -21.9 10.8 18.0 0.0 104.8 0.0 -1.7 -0.4 22
Brazil 1 -4.7 -6.8 17.6 10.1 0.0 63.8 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 207
Chile 3 -4.6 -9.5 10.9 3.3 0.0 49.9 0.0 -10.1 -6.5 18
Tajikistan 3 -4.4 -14.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 -0.8 -1.1 -1.0 8
Malaysia 5 -4.3 -12.5 26.9 23.3 0.0 16.5 0.0 -27.3 -12.5 31
Uruguay 1 -4.2 -13.5 9.6 7.5 0.0 69.8 0.0 -3.8 -1.1 3
Ethiopia 1 -4.0 -11.4 10.4 6.8 0.0 11.3 0.0 -1.2 -0.6 105
Kazakhstan 3 -4.0 -13.4 1.5 0.0 0.0 7.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 19
Thailand 4 -3.3 -12.3 13.2 13.5 0.0 16.3 0.0 -0.6 -0.2 68
Cuba 2 -3.1 -4.6 6.1 0.0 0.0 30.1 -15.8 -55.9 -41.8 11
Senegal 3 -3.0 -9.6 4.2 4.3 0.0 7.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 15
Colombia 2 -2.8 -8.2 22.9 0.0 0.0 28.2 -0.4 -54.0 -36.7 48
Sudan 4 -2.7 -7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 -7.0 -20.8 -14.8 37
Panama 5 -2.3 -3.7 20.5 0.0 0.0 34.8 -13.2 -73.9 -54.2 4
Venezuela 5 -2.3 -4.8 12.9 4.5 0.0 31.2 0.0 -17.1 -11.7 31
Honduras 5 -2.2 -4.8 16.1 0.0 0.0 32.0 -6.9 -39.1 -29.4 9
Bangladesh 5 -2.1 -6.2 0.0 7.1 8.5 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 158
Haiti 5 -1.7 -5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2 -1.6 -5.8 -4.2 11
Nigeria 1 -1.6 -3.4 2.5 1.0 3.6 13.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 191
Dominican Republic 5 -1.5 -4.2 10.3 0.0 0.0 35.3 -29.0 -86.0 -64.9 11
Angola 5 -1.2 -4.0 2.5 2.1 0.0 9.4 0.0 -6.6 -5.5 29
Lebanon 5 -1.1 -11.6 7.2 0.0 0.0 13.2 -10.3 -81.6 -56.5 6
Philippines 2 -1.0 -3.6 9.8 9.4 4.5 20.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 104
Yemen 4 -0.7 -4.3 8.9 6.8 0.0 4.1 0.0 -2.9 -4.0 28
Ghana 5 -0.3 -7.8 7.8 8.0 13.5 15.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 27
Cameroon 1 0.2 -2.3 10.1 9.6 21.6 17.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 25
Somalia 3 0.6 -1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 -0.2 -14.4 -15.9 8
Afghanistan 3 0.7 -7.8 0.0 9.0 15.2 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 34
Jordan 3 1.0 -2.8 17.0 0.0 0.0 10.2 -1.6 -75.8 -48.4 10
Uzbekistan 5 1.0 -4.0 8.5 10.6 14.3 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 30
Benin 4 1.8 -5.4 2.8 9.5 23.5 29.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11
Gambia, The 1 1.9 -8.7 0.0 7.5 33.8 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2
Iran 2 2.3 -4.8 48.5 46.1 7.2 10.9 0.0 0.0 -2.0 82
Turkmenistan 5 2.5 -13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 -0.1 -2.6 -1.4 5
Mali 2 4.0 -6.5 5.4 13.8 28.3 13.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 18
Syria 5 4.4 -10.4 17.4 0.0 0.0 29.5 -1.0 -69.6 -43.9 18
Egypt 3 6.0 1.0 9.4 1.4 0.0 36.7 0.0 -24.9 -16.3 97
Iraq 5 26.4 10.4 6.1 4.5 0.0 3.2 0.0 -5.4 -2.2 39
Algeria 0 0.0 0.0 14.6 0.0 0.0 16.0 -0.6 -43.9 -30.3 41
Bhutan 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 1
Central African Republic 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.3 -0.1 -4.8 -3.6 6
Congo-Brazzaville 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 -0.8 -25.5 -19.5 5
Cyprus 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 49.1 -1.4 -63.1 -30.7 1
Denmark 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8 -0.5 -40.8 -28.7 6
Djibouti 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.7 -74.6 -36.8 1
Equatorial Guinea 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -94.3 -73.0 1
Estonia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 -2.8 -63.6 -52.0 1
Finland 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -1.3 -82.9 -62.8 5
Gabon 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 -6.1 -4.4 2
Guinea 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 12
Guinea-Bissau 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 2
Guyana 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 -27.3 -72.9 -56.1 1
Ireland 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.0 -0.9 -52.2 -35.5 5
Israel 0 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 58.3 -2.5 -69.4 -45.2 8
Ivory Coast 0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.8 0.0 9.5 0.0 -1.0 -0.6 24
Jamaica 0 0.0 0.0 8.1 0.0 0.0 29.3 -33.5 -88.1 -67.3 3
Kuwait 0 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 23.4 -0.2 -33.5 -19.9 3
Latvia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 -18.5 -92.2 -77.4 2
Liberia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 -7.0 -5.8 5
Libya 0 0.0 0.0 6.5 0.0 0.0 32.6 -2.0 -61.3 -38.6 7
Lithuania 0 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 9.3 -3.6 -56.3 -46.2 3
Luxembourg 0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 5.1 -0.1 -49.0 -36.4 1
Madagascar 0 0.0 0.0 4.1 4.1 2.7 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 25
Mongolia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -32.8 -98.1 -70.4 3
Norway 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 -0.1 -58.0 -40.4 5
Oman 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 -7.4 -24.7 -17.7 3
Papua New Guinea 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 -1.7 -1.1 7
Sierra Leone 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 6
Suriname 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 -42.1 -88.5 -69.6 1
Sweden 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 -1.0 -72.2 -52.7 10
Togo 0 0.0 0.0 6.6 6.6 5.9 23.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 8
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0.0 0.0 26.0 0.0 0.0 25.5 -12.4 -85.7 -61.2 1
Tunisia 0 0.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 0.0 20.9 -2.5 -67.4 -43.6 11
United Arab Emirates 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.6 -1.3 -32.7 -18.0 6
United Kingdom 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 -0.2 -43.6 -28.8 65
Global 4 -14.1 -24.9 16.1 6.6 0.3 38.6 -2.0 -12.2 -8.0 5835
Population in countries with:
>30% kcal change 413
>20% kcal change 838
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>10% kcal change 1,467
STUinit = 0 526
STUyear1 = 0 2,311
STUyear4 = 0 5,073
Useyear1 < -10% 373
Useyear4 < -10% 1,962
Useyear4 < -20% 1,243
Useyear4 < -30% 910
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Table S5. Country-level changes in wheat production, reserves, and use. Same as Table S3, but for wheat only.
Country Kcal change STU STU STU Use Use Use Use Population
year mean max. initial year 1 year 4 initial year 1 year 4 year 1–5 current
(104 mean
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) kcal/cap) (%) (%) (%) (million)
Czech Republic 4 -38.6 -49.0 14.6 0.0 0.0 86.8 -0.6 -23.2 -6.0 11
Slovakia 4 -37.7 -47.6 13.0 0.0 0.0 73.4 -0.8 -30.3 -10.3 5
Poland 4 -35.3 -43.7 11.2 0.0 0.0 66.0 -1.3 -32.9 -17.3 38
Ukraine 4 -29.3 -39.9 16.0 0.0 0.0 86.7 -0.8 -8.2 -3.7 44
Hungary 4 -29.0 -36.4 18.3 0.0 0.0 83.6 -0.5 -5.1 -2.4 10
Latvia 3 -28.9 -54.1 18.9 0.0 0.0 69.3 -1.1 -5.6 -4.6 2
Kazakhstan 2 -28.0 -43.7 52.1 13.1 0.0 66.6 0.0 -3.3 -3.1 19
Denmark 3 -26.1 -41.3 12.2 0.0 0.0 240.6 -1.4 -9.9 -7.4 6
Moldova 4 -25.6 -47.9 42.2 28.0 0.0 42.9 0.0 -22.5 -8.1 3
Serbia 4 -24.1 -31.7 32.9 34.4 0.0 53.1 0.0 -11.1 -2.7 7
Albania 4 -22.8 -27.5 3.6 1.1 0.0 63.6 0.0 -58.5 -27.6 3
Romania 4 -22.3 -28.5 12.7 5.3 0.0 67.0 0.0 -14.5 -3.7 22
Turkey 4 -21.5 -24.5 9.7 23.3 0.0 68.4 0.0 -18.8 -5.0 81
Tajikistan 3 -21.0 -24.3 6.3 6.2 0.0 53.4 0.0 -22.1 -17.9 8
Bulgaria 4 -20.5 -27.1 16.6 11.4 0.0 96.7 0.0 -3.1 -1.5 7
China 3 -20.1 -22.3 38.0 30.0 0.0 16.5 0.0 -12.6 -6.6 1379
Croatia 4 -19.9 -29.3 13.3 5.3 0.0 49.2 0.0 -6.6 -2.1 4
Macedonia 4 -19.8 -28.5 11.4 10.9 0.0 61.5 0.0 -49.5 -18.2 2
Greece 4 -19.3 -24.2 8.9 11.3 0.0 68.2 0.0 -26.5 -9.0 11
Tunisia 4 -18.6 -26.7 25.4 21.3 0.0 67.0 0.0 -44.6 -19.6 11
Lithuania 3 -18.0 -28.5 21.1 0.0 0.0 68.0 0.0 -3.9 -2.9 3
Japan 4 -17.9 -23.1 21.6 20.2 0.0 13.1 0.0 -21.8 -8.7 126
Russia 4 -17.4 -23.6 15.5 1.9 0.0 84.5 0.0 -2.5 -1.5 142
Armenia 4 -17.2 -23.9 6.5 1.6 0.0 45.7 0.0 -55.2 -35.6 3
Austria 4 -17.2 -22.1 14.4 0.0 0.0 40.0 -0.1 -5.4 -3.2 9
Iran 4 -17.0 -20.1 19.4 15.8 0.0 48.1 0.0 -19.8 -9.1 82
Canada 4 -16.8 -41.5 74.3 42.7 0.0 19.3 0.0 -5.5 -2.4 36
Montenegro 4 -16.7 -25.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 -0.2 -81.2 -35.7 1
Switzerland 4 -16.4 -22.3 24.7 18.3 0.0 34.4 0.0 -40.2 -16.8 8
United States 5 -15.7 -20.3 39.8 27.4 0.0 19.9 0.0 -2.5 -1.6 327
Afghanistan 3 -15.5 -20.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.6 -0.6 -18.2 -13.8 34
Italy 4 -15.2 -20.3 7.8 9.3 0.0 58.1 0.0 -16.8 -4.6 62
Uzbekistan 5 -15.2 -18.9 12.1 10.4 0.0 69.3 0.0 -17.1 -11.7 30
United Kingdom 4 -14.6 -21.9 12.1 0.0 0.0 66.2 -0.1 -6.8 -2.4 65
Georgia 4 -14.5 -21.9 28.1 25.5 0.0 38.9 0.0 -71.9 -39.0 5
Kyrgyzstan 4 -13.6 -19.8 22.1 16.8 0.0 51.3 0.0 -21.5 -13.4 6
Laos 2 -12.8 -24.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 -100.0 -43.9 7
Australia 4 -12.7 -17.3 52.5 27.4 0.0 47.6 0.0 -3.5 -1.5 23
Mongolia 1 -12.5 -19.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.8 -0.5 -48.9 -29.6 3
Portugal 5 -12.4 -21.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 46.1 -0.1 -50.9 -26.9 11
Sweden 2 -12.3 -34.1 14.5 0.0 0.0 49.5 -0.5 -2.3 -2.3 10
Turkmenistan 4 -12.1 -19.6 55.1 55.0 41.5 56.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5
Netherlands 5 -12.0 -25.5 2.5 0.0 0.0 108.4 -0.2 -33.4 -15.7 17
Syria 4 -11.7 -16.9 114.8 112.7 0.0 -8.2 0.0 -2.4 -0.8 18
Lebanon 2 -11.2 -16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 -0.2 -53.0 -24.7 6
France 4 -11.0 -15.9 20.7 16.5 0.0 80.1 0.0 -2.9 -1.4 67
New Zealand 4 -11.0 -12.7 28.7 24.6 0.0 34.9 0.0 -11.2 -4.4 5
Eritrea 4 -10.5 -19.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.6 -0.2 -73.7 -37.5 6
Guatemala 2 -10.2 -16.2 28.2 28.2 0.0 9.0 0.0 -23.3 -10.8 15
Uruguay 1 -10.2 -15.6 73.2 62.9 4.1 22.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 3
Spain 3 -9.5 -16.4 7.4 3.7 0.0 62.5 0.0 -28.1 -14.0 49
Belgium 4 -8.7 -13.7 7.1 2.9 0.0 76.3 0.0 -5.7 -3.4 11
South Korea 5 -8.3 -13.7 31.2 29.7 0.0 14.0 0.0 -40.8 -18.0 51
Jordan 4 -8.0 -17.1 56.2 52.2 0.0 11.8 0.0 -73.4 -24.9 10
North Korea 4 -7.6 -13.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 -39.1 -22.2 25
Belarus 5 -7.5 -14.7 16.1 9.5 0.0 49.9 0.0 -11.7 -8.1 10
Iraq 4 -7.5 -13.9 10.9 10.9 0.0 40.3 0.0 -27.0 -11.3 39
Algeria 3 -6.8 -19.9 29.7 27.4 0.0 43.4 0.0 -29.9 -11.9 41
Ethiopia 1 -6.4 -8.6 5.2 0.0 0.0 8.4 0.0 -9.8 -5.2 105
Germany 1 -6.4 -27.8 14.2 0.6 0.0 67.9 0.0 -2.2 -1.6 81
Brazil 1 -6.3 -10.8 18.0 15.3 0.0 14.2 0.0 -0.7 -0.3 207
Argentina 1 -5.7 -11.1 29.6 7.3 0.0 25.1 0.0 -1.3 -0.9 44
Bhutan 3 -4.5 -10.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 3.5 0.0 -2.1 -2.5 1
Chile 3 -3.9 -11.4 12.6 10.0 0.0 37.3 0.0 -5.6 -2.9 18
Saudi Arabia 4 -3.5 -6.0 82.8 88.4 63.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 29
Lesotho 3 -3.3 -16.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 2
Zimbabwe 1 -2.9 -4.7 20.4 18.2 0.0 3.7 0.0 -19.8 -8.6 14
Bangladesh 1 -2.3 -4.9 20.6 18.3 0.0 4.1 0.0 -41.3 -20.3 158
Vietnam 3 -2.0 -5.7 25.1 25.1 0.0 2.9 0.0 -38.1 -14.6 96
Botswana 1 -1.9 -7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 2
Libya 1 -1.9 -10.1 9.0 6.9 0.0 68.0 0.0 -69.0 -33.4 7
Myanmar (Burma) 5 -1.8 -6.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 -14.8 -7.3 55
South Africa 2 -1.7 -7.8 18.3 17.8 0.0 16.6 0.0 -6.6 -2.3 55
Bolivia 1 -1.1 -3.5 16.0 15.5 0.0 10.4 0.0 -4.2 -1.9 11
Cyprus 3 -1.0 -4.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 57.6 -0.1 -69.6 -29.1 1
Azerbaijan 5 -0.9 -4.8 26.4 30.2 0.0 68.2 0.0 -29.5 -15.0 10
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Nepal 5 -0.9 -2.4 0.0 2.0 7.4 17.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29
Ecuador 3 -0.7 -3.8 13.5 13.2 0.0 9.1 0.0 -25.5 -11.3 16
Egypt 1 -0.2 -3.3 25.5 24.7 0.0 41.3 0.0 -27.3 -11.2 97
Morocco 1 0.3 -18.5 24.0 23.7 0.0 51.2 0.0 -10.5 -3.8 34
Zambia 1 0.9 -2.3 12.0 12.4 0.0 2.5 0.0 -14.9 -6.7 16
Nigeria 1 1.3 -1.8 5.3 5.1 0.0 5.3 0.0 -23.5 -14.3 191
Mexico 1 1.7 -1.6 7.2 8.4 0.0 14.6 0.0 -1.7 -0.9 125
Yemen 5 1.7 -3.9 9.0 8.1 0.0 24.6 0.0 -37.0 -18.5 28
Niger 2 4.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 -63.0 -32.9 19
Sudan 4 4.8 -2.4 5.9 9.5 0.0 16.7 0.0 -17.4 -5.4 37
Israel 3 5.1 -10.4 15.6 11.8 0.0 51.1 0.0 -63.6 -33.4 8
Angola 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 -54.7 -26.9 29
Benin 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 -56.1 -26.2 11
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0.0 0.0 30.0 27.8 0.0 40.8 0.0 -55.0 -17.8 4
Burkina Faso 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 -56.7 -28.8 20
Burundi 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 -39.2 -27.6 11
Cambodia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 -47.6 -19.4 16
Cameroon 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 -32.3 -14.5 25
Central African Republic 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 -39.6 -14.5 6
Chad 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 -36.9 -18.5 12
Colombia 0 0.0 0.0 10.9 10.9 0.0 8.4 0.0 -19.0 -9.3 48
Congo-Brazzaville 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.1 0.0 -33.3 -18.0 5
Costa Rica 0 0.0 0.0 39.5 39.4 0.0 6.7 0.0 -4.6 -3.3 5
Cuba 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.4 -0.1 -42.8 -21.4 11
Djibouti 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.8 -0.2 -61.5 -29.6 1
Dominican Republic 0 0.0 0.0 8.7 8.7 0.0 11.8 0.0 -28.8 -16.3 11
El Salvador 0 0.0 0.0 51.1 51.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 -9.8 -6.1 6
Equatorial Guinea 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 0.0 -51.6 -27.7 1
Estonia 0 0.0 0.0 12.6 9.7 0.0 65.3 0.0 -2.0 -1.3 1
Finland 0 0.0 0.0 11.4 9.7 0.0 41.8 0.0 -1.3 -0.8 5
Gabon 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.3 0.0 -33.4 -15.4 2
Gambia, The 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 0.0 -90.3 -34.3 2
Ghana 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 -34.2 -15.8 27
Guinea 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 -0.3 -56.3 -20.4 12
Guinea-Bissau 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 -0.1 -65.6 -32.3 2
Guyana 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 0.0 -33.1 -16.9 1
Haiti 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 -0.2 -39.0 -23.4 11
Honduras 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.0 -35.5 -17.6 9
Indonesia 0 0.0 0.0 28.5 28.4 0.0 4.5 0.0 -30.5 -10.6 261
Ireland 0 0.0 0.0 7.0 5.3 0.0 87.9 0.0 -33.7 -18.4 5
Ivory Coast 0 0.0 0.0 8.3 8.2 0.0 3.8 0.0 -22.2 -7.6 24
Jamaica 0 0.0 0.0 9.2 9.2 0.0 36.8 0.0 -25.4 -12.2 3
Kenya 0 0.0 0.0 18.2 16.2 0.0 5.7 0.0 -33.6 -17.1 48
Kuwait 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.0 0.0 -23.8 -9.7 3
Liberia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 -62.4 -24.2 5
Luxembourg 0 0.0 0.0 10.0 8.5 0.0 48.8 0.0 -4.8 -2.8 1
Madagascar 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 -36.0 -18.5 25
Malawi 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 -32.2 -16.1 19
Malaysia 0 0.0 0.0 32.1 32.1 0.0 7.3 0.0 -19.5 -6.4 31
Mali 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 -51.6 -25.5 18
Mauritania 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.6 -0.1 -40.9 -19.8 4
Mozambique 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 -28.5 -15.3 27
Namibia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 0.0 -22.1 -11.7 2
Nicaragua 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 -40.6 -20.0 6
Norway 0 0.0 0.0 45.9 40.6 0.0 28.2 0.0 -29.6 -15.6 5
Oman 0 0.0 0.0 17.8 15.3 0.0 17.6 0.0 -20.3 -7.4 3
Panama 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.8 -0.1 -38.3 -22.3 4
Papua New Guinea 0 0.0 0.0 21.2 21.2 0.0 5.7 0.0 -12.9 -6.3 7
Paraguay 0 0.0 0.0 143.2 143.2 0.0 -8.2 0.0 0.0 -0.4 7
Peru 0 0.0 0.0 15.7 15.2 0.0 14.2 0.0 -14.5 -5.3 31
Philippines 0 0.0 0.0 21.9 21.2 0.0 6.5 0.0 -39.5 -19.3 104
Rwanda 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 -75.2 -48.1 12
Senegal 0 0.0 0.0 7.7 7.7 0.0 7.7 0.0 -28.1 -11.6 15
Sierra Leone 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 -57.3 -31.9 6
Slovenia 0 0.0 0.0 5.9 3.0 0.0 45.5 0.0 -37.7 -15.1 2
Somalia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 -91.8 -54.3 8
Sri Lanka 0 0.0 0.0 32.8 32.6 0.0 10.0 0.0 -14.2 -4.8 22
Suriname 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 -0.1 -80.2 -48.3 1
Swaziland 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 1
Tanzania, U.R. of 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 -0.1 -29.9 -12.9 54
Thailand 0 0.0 0.0 51.1 51.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 -26.9 -10.5 68
Togo 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 -38.9 -16.6 8
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 36.2 0.0 -20.8 -13.3 1
Uganda 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 -0.1 -56.1 -29.2 40
United Arab Emirates 0 0.0 0.0 10.2 9.3 0.0 41.2 0.0 -23.8 -8.4 6
Venezuela 0 0.0 0.0 6.0 6.0 0.0 16.6 0.0 -25.3 -13.2 31
D.R. Congo 0 0.0 0.0 8.7 8.6 0.0 1.5 0.0 -43.5 -22.0 83
Global 4 -12.1 -14.2 24.7 17.6 0.6 23.1 -0.1 -14.1 -6.6 5835
Population in countries with:
>30% kcal change 54
>20% kcal change 1,645
Jägermeyr et al. 27 of 29
>10% kcal change 2,808
STUinit = 0 647
STUyear1 = 0 880
STUyear4 = 0 5,769
Useyear1 < -10% 3
Useyear4 < -10% 4,292
Useyear4 < -20% 2,285
Useyear4 < -30% 1,409
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